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PROPERTY-AS-SOCIETY
TIMOTHY M. MULVANEY*
Modern regulatory takings disputes present a key battleground for
competing conceptions of property. This Article offers the following
account of the three leading theories: a libertarian view sees property as
creating a sphere of individual freedom and control (property-as-liberty); a
pecuniary view sees property as a tool of economic investment (property-as-
investment); and a progressive view sees property as serving a wide range
of evolving communal values that include, but are not limited to, those
advanced under both the libertarian and pecuniary conceptions (property-as-
society). Against this backdrop, the Article offers two contentions. First, on
normative grounds, it asserts that the conception of property-as-society
presents a more useful structure for assessing whether an allocative choice
is fair and just absent compensation than the conceptions of property-as-
liberty and property-as-investment. Second, on doctrinal grounds, it
suggests that the property-as-liberty conception has fallen from grace in
takings jurisprudence since its peak in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council in 1992; moreover, while the property-as-investment understanding
remains of some force, the property-as-society conception has ascended to a
position of jurisprudential prominence, as most recently evidenced in both
the majority and the dissenting opinions in the 2017 matter of Murr v.
Wisconsin.
Introduction .................................................................... 912
I. Lucas R evisited........................................................914
A . The C laim ......................................................... 915
B . The Platform ..................................................... 916
II. Property-as-Liberty ............................... 917
A. Conceiving of Property as Liberty... ............... 918
B. Property-as-Liberty: A Critical Normative Assessment... 922
III. Property-as-Investment............................930
A. Conceiving of Property as Investment .... .......... 930
B. Property-as-Investment: A Critical Normative
Assessment ............................ ..... 933
IV. Property-as-Society .......................... ..... 935
A. Conceiving of Property as Society..... .............. 935
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Texas A&M
University School of Law. Thank you to Peter Byrne, Eric Freyfogle, Chris Odinet,
and Joseph Singer for reviewing earlier drafts of this article and to Nestor Davidson,
Steven Eagle, James Huffman, John Lovett, Lorna Fox O'Mahony, Nadav Shoked,
Laura Underkuffler, and Michael Wolf for insightful conversations on the article's
theme. I benefitted from the opportunity to present various iterations of this project at
Harvard Law School, Maastricht University, the University of Cambridge, and the
University of South Carolina Law School. I am grateful for the fine research assistance
of Kendal Camley. Special thanks to Texas A&M University for supporting this
research.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
B. Property-as-Society: A Critical Normative Assessment... 937
V. The Jurisprudence: Competing Conceptions of Property....... 942
A. The Fading Influence of the Property-as-Liberty View ... 943
B. The Mounting Influence of the Property-as-Society
View ................................... 949
1. The Murr Majority and the Property-as-Society
View................................. 953
a. Murr's Eschewal of the Property-as-Liberty
View .............................. 953
b. Murr's Support for the Property-as-Society
View.......................... 955
c. Initial Critiques of Murr as Takings Doctrine ..... 960
2. The Murr Dissent and the Property-as-Society View . 964
Conclusion .................................. ..... 968
INTRODUCTION
According to the prevailing judicial interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment's "Takings Clause," the state is liable where a regulatory
decision reallocates property interests in a manner that is markedly
unfair and unjust to an individual property owner absent compensation.'
There is general agreement that the unfairness or injustice of such a
decision ordinarily is tied to the extent to which that decision
reasonably should have been expected by the takings claimant. Just how
an owner's expectations are to be evaluated, though, is a contested
matter of seminal importance in more global discussions surrounding
the very meaning of the institution of property. It is thus unsurprising
that, since its reemergence in the late 1970s, regulatory takings law has
served not only as a forum for case-by-case wrangling between
individual owners and state entities but a key battleground for
competing libertarian, pecuniary, and progressive conceptions of
property itself.
While these varying conceptions of property often overlap and are
best considered as existing along a spectrum rather than in isolation,
they roughly can be summarized as follows: a libertarian view sees
property as creating a sphere of individual freedom and control
(property-as-liberty); a pecuniary view sees property as a tool of
economic investment (property-as-investment); and a progressive view
sees property as serving a whole host of evolving social goals
including, but not limited to, the aforementioned goals of promoting
freedom and encouraging economic investment (property-as-society).
1. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
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Beginning with its well-known 1978 opinion in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,2 the Supreme Court weaved and
winded through these competing conceptions in takings cases for the
better part of fifteen years.3 Yet, in 1992, a majority of the Court in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,' in an opinion authored by
Justice Antonin Scalia, pushed takings jurisprudence firmly towards
conceiving of property in decidedly libertarian terms. Justice Anthony
Kennedy's opinion' concurring only in the judgment rested on the
property-as-investment view, while separate dissents by Justices Harry
Blackmun6 and John Paul Stevens' depended on the property-as-society
view.
As Part I below sets out, the splintered nature of the Lucas
decision presents both an effective platform for evaluating the
normative force of these competing conceptions and a useful baseline
against which one can gauge these conceptions' doctrinal influence a
quarter-century later. Parts II through IV delineate and offer a
normative critique of, in turn, the property-as-liberty, property-as-
investment, and property-as-society conceptions. Part V moves from
theory to the extant jurisprudence, with a special emphasis on the
Court's 2017 decision in Murr v. Wisconsin.' In the course thereof, this
Article makes two principal claims.
The first claim rests on normative grounds: Property, as an
institution crafted to benefit the public interest, necessarily must be
accountable to the plural values that characterize the nation's
democratic culture. To maintain such accountability, the state should
make allocative adjustments as social, economic, and moral
perspectives on the content of these values-and perspectives on what
might harm these values-evolve over time. The pluralistic property-as-
society view underlying Justice Blackmun's and Justice Stevens's Lucas
2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3. For holdings supportive of the property-as-liberty view, see, for example,
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For holdings supportive of the property-as-investment
view, see, for example, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987). For holdings supportive of the property-as-society view, see, for example,
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987).
4. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
5. Id. at 1032-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 1036-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 1061-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
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dissents, therefore, presents the most helpful structure for assessing the
justificatory nature of a state re-allocative choice absent compensation.
The second claim is doctrinal in character: The libertarian
understanding of property supported by the Lucas majority opinion
largely has faded from view in regulatory takings law. Moreover, while
the property-as-investment understanding outlined in Justice Kennedy's
Lucas concurrence remains of some force in takings jurisprudence, both
the majority and dissenting opinions in Murr demonstrate that this
understanding has given way in several important respects to the
property-as-society view. This Article concludes, therefore, that,
twenty-five years on, the lasting legacy of Lucas, both normatively and
doctrinally, lies in its dissents.
I. LUCAS REVISITED
In its 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, the Supreme Court identified a non-exclusive list of
considerations that are relevant to a court's determining in an individual
takings case whether an imposition stemming from a new regulatory
safeguard or obligation is fair and just absent compensation.9 To decide
when "fairness and justice" require that "economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
concentrated on a few persons," the Justices instructed lower courts to
"engag[e] in . . . ad hoc, factual inquiries" that include contemplating
(1) "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;" (2) the
"nature" and "extent" to which the regulation has interfered with the
claimant's reasonable "investment-backed expectations;" and (3) the
"character of the governmental action." Proponents of a libertarian
9. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24, 130-
31 (1978); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (describing the considerations
explicitly referenced in Penn Central as "keenly relevant"); Herzberg v. County of
Plumas, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 597-98 (Ct. App. 2005) (remarking on the non-
exclusivity of the considerations explicitly identified in Penn Central as relevant to
regulatory takings claims); Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186, 214
n.38 (Ct. App. 2008) (describing the three considerations documented in Penn Central
as the "principle guidelines" but explaining how the California courts have "identified
from United States Supreme Court cases . . . a number of additional, nonexclusive
factors that might be relevant considerations in a particular case of an alleged Penn
Central regulatory taking") (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539
(2005)). The Supreme Court's June 2017 opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin includes
language supportive of non-exclusivity. See, e.g., Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 ("A central
dynamic of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is its flexibility."); id. at
1954 (referring to "a complex of factors" relevant to the regulatory takings analysis)
(quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)).
10. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, 130-31 (emphasis added).
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conception of property lamented Penn Central's "ad hocery"" and saw
in the case of one David Lucas an opportunity to push takings law in a
new direction.12 In outlining Mr. Lucas's claim and the Court's basic
reaction thereto, this abbreviated Part positions the Lucas case as a
platform for the theoretical and doctrinal discussion in the Parts that
follow.
A. The Claim
In 1986, after reaping significant returns through his development
company's sale of more than 1000 lots on a narrow barrier island in
South Carolina, Mr. Lucas purchased from the company two such lots
for himself.13 Though the state's coastal zone had been subject to
extensive regulation for some time, these lots were considered buildable
when Mr. Lucas acquired them even though, apparently, similarly
situated lots in all other east coast states were not.14 Soon after Mr.
Lucas's acquisition, the state legislature passed the 1988 South Carolina
Beachfront Management Act." Relying on a wealth of new scientific
evidence highlighting the impacts of erosion emanating from the type of
development that was already proliferating on the state's shores, this
legislation served in many respects as a last ditch measure to preserve
the natural features of a beach and dune system that protects the public
and property from harm.' 6 The Act established a coastal setback line
11. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-Hocery: A Comment on
Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Property Revival; Economic Rights Gurus Look
to High Court, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1992, at 44, LEXIS ("This term could be a dream
come true for property owners fuming over regulations restricting the use of their land
and for conservative legal strategists longing for an economic rights revival."). The
label "dream come true" is apt, for just several years prior leading takings scholar
Professor Joseph Sax had asserted that "the path of noncompensation seems rather
clearly set" and he saw "no evidence . . . [it] will not continue." See Joseph L. Sax,
Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481, 495-96
(1983).
13. See Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause
to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 299, 304 (Gerald
Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009).
14. See Carol M. Rose, The Story of Lucas: Environmental Land Use
Regulation Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
STORIES 237 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
15. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09 (1992).
16. Id. at 1007-08. In the words of Professor Richard Lazarus, "[t]he
Beachfront Management Act sought to put an end to the human folly of placing people,
lives, livelihoods, and homes in those places most exposed to the destructive forces of
nature." Richard J. Lazarus, Lucas Unspun, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 13, 29
(2007). See also John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings
Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 n. 18 (1993) (explaining how oceanfront
development interrupts the natural migration of protective sand dunes and consists of
9152018:911
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based on historic high water events of the prior forty years and
prohibited development or reconstruction on any lots-including the
two recently purchased by Mr. Lucas-seaward of that line."
Mr. Lucas filed suit seeking compensation for the alleged
unconstitutional regulatory taking of his properties." He advocated a
new, per se rule by which the sheer weight of the economic impact
resulting from a land use restriction of this nature automatically triggers
takings liability regardless of whether it mirrors a common law
restriction or otherwise serves an important public interest, such as
health and safety or environmental preservation.19
B. The Platform
The trial court found that the Act made the two parcels-which
Mr. Lucas together had purchased for upwards of $1,000,000-
economically worthless, and, obliging the theory advanced by Mr.
Lucas, ordered the state to pay takings compensation.20 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, asserting that legislative restrictions
on land uses that seek to prevent harm do not give rise to takings
liability even where they render a property interest devoid of all
economic value.21 In a dramatic move just days after the controversial
materials that in major storms are converted to debris that become "windborne missiles
that endanger the lives and property of others"). But see Brief for Institute of Justice as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lucas, 505 U.S. 1006 (No. 91-453), reprinted in
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Brief of the Institute for
Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1225, 1248-
49 (1992) (conceding that anti-armoring provisions along the coast protect the public
from nuisance-like-harm and are appropriate without compensation, but asserting that
South Carolina did not "show[] that the construction of a house on a beachfront lot ...
will affect the stability of the land on which neighbors have constructed their own
houses"). The state legislature also cited the Act's benefits to the tourism industry and
plant and animal habitat preservation. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1992).
17. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
18. Id. at 1009.
19. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991), rev'd,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) ("Lucas maintains that if a regulation operates to deprive a
landowner of 'all economically viable use' of his property, it has worked a 'taking' for
which compensation is due, regardless of any other consideration."); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 25-26, Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (No. 91-453) ("QUESTION: You want the
per se rule, and you argued it below. If it takes away all the economic value, it is a
taking that has to be compensated. [The state and its amici] are saying that is so
sometimes but not all the time, that if there is a nuisance, if it is threatening the public
safety, you can take it all away without paying and you deny that. [COUNSEL FOR
MR. LUCAS]: I deny that, yes, sir.").
20. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-09.
21. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d at 901-02 (citing Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
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confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas-a noted opponent of the
state's imposing on traditionally-recognized property rights via new
regulations-the U.S. Supreme Court granted Mr. Lucas's petition for
certiorari.22
The Lucas Court decided 6-3 to reverse the South Carolina
Supreme Court and remand the case for application of the "test" the
Court fashioned. Only four Justices, though, joined Justice Antonin
Scalia in the majority opinion, which in several ways reflected a strong
libertarian understanding of property.23 Justice Kennedy concurred only
in the judgment and rested his view of the case on the theory that
property amounts to a tool of economic investment.24 Justice Blackmun
and Justice Stevens issued separate, piercing dissents, both of which
reflected more progressive, socially-oriented conceptions of property
than those advanced by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Using the Lucas
case as a platform, the next three Parts both outline and critically assess
these varying conceptions of property in turn. Thereafter, the fifth and
final Part examines the doctrinal influence of these conceptions in
regulatory takings law twenty-five years after the Court issued its
decision in Lucas.
II. PROPERTY-AS-LIBERTY
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas rested in several
respects on the decidedly libertarian view that property is one's castle,
and that owners generally are immunized from the burdens of
government regulation so long as they keep their activities within the
castle's bounds. Drawing on Justice Scalia's opinion for illustrative
purposes, the first section of this Part explains the basic contours of this
conception of property. The second section, in subjecting this
22. Justice Thomas previously had delivered lectures advocating "aggressive
protection of property rights under the federal Constitution." Richard J. Lazarus, The
Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement
Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 797-98 (2006).
23. After initially indicating that he would join the majority opinion, id. at
806, Justice David Souter simply authored a statement outlining his position that the
case should be dismissed as improvidently granted in light of the implausible factual
conclusion on which the plaintiffs entire claim was based: that a regulation had
deprived an oceanfront lot as devoid of all value simply because its owner could no
longer build a permanent, occupiable structure upon it. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1076
(statement of Souter, J.). Other Justices questioned this finding, too. See, e.g., id. at
1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1044-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
1065 n.3 (Stevens J., dissenting). Such skepticism proved worthy when it later became
known that an inland neighbor was willing to buy one of the parcels subject to a
restrictive covenant precluding development for $315,000 to ensure the preservation of
her ocean view. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-3(b)(2) (5th ed.
2012).
24. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9172018:911
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conception to normative critique, contends that the property-as-liberty
view is not especially constructive in resolving takings disputes given
that it both largely neglects the liberty interests of non-claimants and
fails to appreciate those democratic values beyond liberty that property
serves.
A. Conceiving of Property as Liberty
Citing favorably to Professor Richard Epstein's famous, strident
critique of the Court's "eschew[al]" of any "set formula" in Penn
Central,25 Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas announced what it
deemed a "categorical formulation." 26 In accord with this formulation,
the state must pay takings compensation, without "inquiry into the
public interest advanced," where-on the Court's various phrasings that
it presumably deemed synonymous-a regulation amounts to a "total
taking" or a "total deprivation of beneficial" or "feasible" use of
property, eliminates "all economically productive or beneficial uses" of
property, or requires that property "be left substantially in its natural
state" or "economically idle."27
Rejecting Mr. Lucas's unconditional theory, though, the Court
conceded that common law tort and property doctrines limit the liberty
of an owner to use her land as she pleases so as to protect the liberty of
others to put their lands to their desired uses. Takings liability,
according to the Court, does not attach where a regulation merely
restates "background principles" of the common law "of property and
nuisance" that, for example, "forestall . . . grave threats to the lives
and property of others." 2 8 However, if a regulation supplements the
class of uses deemed harmful under these common law principles and
the only economically valuable uses of the claimant's property are those
the regulation now prohibits, the state must purchase that property-or
the owner's liberty to use that property-to prevent what it newly has
concluded are harmful activities.29
25. See id. at 1015 (citing Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and
Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 4 (1987)). At the cited page, Professor Epstein
referred to Penn Central and its progeny as "confused, and often contradictory" and as
an illustration of "intellectual disarray." See Epstein, supra, at 4.
26. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
27. Id. at 1015-20, 1030, 1034. See John D. Echeverria, Antonin Scalia's
Flawed Takings Legacy, 41 VT. L. REv. 689, 711 n.151 (2017) (asserting that
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra gave conflicting guidance on how to interpret Lucas on this
point).
28. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16, 1030.
29. See Humbach, supra note 16, at 3 ("[Fiuture legislative efforts to remedy
deficiencies in the common law of nuisance can now be overturned precisely because
the common law fails to protect people from the particular harm in question.").
918
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The Court initially acknowledged that "background principles" of
the common law evolve in the sense that "changed circumstances or
new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer
so. "30 For instance, the Court explained that regulatory safeguards that
prohibit landfilling where changing hydrological conditions indicate
such an act would flood a neighbor's land or that preclude the operation
of a nuclear plant when new information reveals that it sits astride an
earthquake fault would not be compensable.31 In its next breath, though,
the Court cheapened its own acknowledgement that changing conditions
and new knowledge matter. The South Carolina legislature had voted to
institute the enhanced regulatory safeguards at issue in Lucas as a
result, in part, of its improving understanding of the significant threat
that new and existing coastal development posed to coastal residents
and the public more generally.32 Yet, in remanding the case to the state
courts for the "background principles" determination,3 3 Justice Scalia's
opinion expressed considerable skepticism that such principles, as
traditionally construed at common law, would have precluded Mr.
Lucas's development of single family homes on these two lots,
particularly when his immediate neighbors already had constructed
homes.34 Common law principles, wrote Justice Scalia, "rarely support
prohibition of [this] 'essential use' of land." 3 5
The Lucas majority thus operated on the assumption that the
common law of property creates a pre-political, formally defined, and
static sphere of individual liberty that is legally resistant to the
government's interference through the enactment and enforcement of
new limitations on possession, transfer, and use.3 6 While the Court
30. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827
cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
31. Id. at 1029.
32. Id. at 1007-08.
33. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 314
(1993) (stating the question on remand as follows: "Did [the Beachfront Management
Act], or did it not, contain a norm-a rule or principle-whose effect is to deny to
owners of land (situated as Lucas' was) a secure freedom to build (as Lucas proposed to
build)?").
34. Professor Michelman noted a series of "other pertinent and, it seems,
equally plausible traditions," including, for example, the public's ability to access and
use the beaches of tidal waters, that the Lucas majority disregards. See id. at 323.
35. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 US 78, 86
(1911)); see also J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 399 (2010) (asserting that
any reading of Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas as suggesting "that, over time, what
was once allowed under common law no longer [may be]" is "[n]o doubt . .. not what
[Justice Scalia] intended").
36. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 142 (2003) (describing
the lay tendency to view property as "a bulwark surrounding a sphere of individual
2018:911 919
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uneasily intimated that this property-as-liberty theory applied only in
those highly unusual cases where a regulation deprives property of all
value, it did not attempt to justify why the theory is or should be inapt
when the loss in value is not complete.37 Rather than address this
inconsistency head on, the Court simply asserted that it was
inappropriate for the South Carolina Supreme Court to reject Mr.
Lucas's claim merely in light of the state legislature's recent assertion
that his constructing a home would harm the public. The Court
explained that, to reject Mr. Lucas's claim on remand, the state courts
needed to find that the proposed development "always" had been
"unlawful" and the new restriction simply made this implicit eternal
"dictate" explicit. 8 Unless there is an especially clear historical
application of a common law rule-a rule akin, as one scholar
explained, to "building houses in dunelands is forbidden" 3 9-the South
Carolina state courts not-so-subtly were instructed to conclude that
property owners in Mr. Lucas's shoes can develop their property for
residential purposes as they choose.40
liberty . . . [as] an absolute and inalienable right, which provides security and
protection"). The goal of takings law, as one scholar describes this perspective,
involves identifying "the borders of ownership and . . . protect[ing] . . . those who stay
within the lines" by assuring that the state does not bypass the payment requirement for
condemnatory acts. Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of
Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 309,
325 (2006); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Dueling Denominators and the Demise of Lucas,
60 ARiz. L. REv. 67, 87 (2018) (referring to conceiving of the Takings Clause as
protecting against "condemnation bypass").
37. See Richard Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court
Failed to Clean Up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
151, 183-84 (2017) ("[T]here is something obviously jarring about a rule that allows a
land-use regulation to impair sixty, seventy, or eighty percent of the value of any given
piece of property without compensation. . . . [Tihere is no obvious tipping point along
that continuum where compensation is suddenly required.").
38. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. As one insightful student noted soon after the
decision, legal "principles" do not usually "dictate;" "[t]hat is, after all, what makes
them principles rather than rules." Michelman, supra note 33, at 326 (quoting Michael
E. Wall, (Im)possible Justifications of Lucas 6 (Apr. 28, 1993) (unpublished student
paper) (on file with the William & Mary Law Review)); see also Timothy M.
Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247 (2011),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-new-judicial-takings-construct
[https://perma.cc/JN95-Z86J] (concluding that constricting the common law to its early
moorings would unduly hinder property law's ability to conform with changes in
economics, society, technology, and the environment).
39. Michelman, supra note 33, at 315.
40. Without the benefit of detailed supplementary briefing on the potentially
applicable "background principles" of South Carolina common law, the South Carolina
Supreme Court quickly held that no inherent common law limitation in Mr. Lucas's
title precluded his proposed use. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 485
(1992).
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The implicit direction to South Carolina's state courts, then, was
that restrictions on the development of a confined parcel of privately-
owned land designed to maintain that land in its natural state are
presumptively proscribed absent compensation, at least where the
parcel is deemed economically worthless. To the Lucas majority, Mr.
Lucas had the liberty to determine whether or not to build something;
should his neighbors collectively have desired to deprive him of this
liberty through regulation, they had to both demonstrate a legitimate
public purpose for preventing any economically viable development and
pay Mr. Lucas for his loss. South Carolina's Beachfront Management
Act may well have served such a legitimate public purpose, 4  but it
came at the expense of depriving Mr. Lucas of any meaningful land use
choices. Regardless of the social consequences, these choices are not of
legitimate concern to anyone but Mr. Lucas himself.42
From this vantage point, most decisions by a property owner
concern that owner alone. Property is not conceived in terms of what
owners are obligated to do or avoid for the benefit and protection of
others-including the obligation to avoid perpetrating harm through the
destruction of important ecological services-but instead in terms of
what owners can do for themselves to avoid a substantial personal
economic blow.43 While the Lucas Court concedes that many exercises
of property rights impact others," its view is that it is only the rare
instance where such an exercise illegitimately does so. 5 It follows that,
41. Michelman, supra note 33, at 311 ("Lucas himself agreed (as did all of
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court) that South Carolina's goal of preventing beach
erosion fell easily within the range of the state's proper governmental concerns and that
prohibiting construction on land in the coastal zone was a reasonable way of pursuing
that goal.").
42. See Robert H. Thomas, Restatement (SCOTUS) of Property: What
Happened to Use in Murr v. Wisconsin?, UMKC L. REv. (forthcoming) (July 14,
2018), https://ssm.com/abstract= 3007166 [https://perma.cc/LKS3-5G2S] (asserting
that, in these circumstances, Lucas instructs that "it isn't necessary to look at [the
claimant's] expectations or the nature of the government action or the reasons for it").
43. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1441
(1993) (explaining that, on this view of property, "[o]wnership . . . means at least that
the owner has some right to employ the property for personal benefit, even if it thereby
eliminates 'benefits' that land provides in its natural state"); John D. Echeverria,
Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,471, 10,474 (2009)
("[A]pparently, an actual economic wipeout is sufficient by itself to establish a taking
44. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 (1992)
("Practically all human activities unless carried on in a wilderness interfere to some
extent with others or involve some risk of interference.") (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822, cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
45. To one prominent critic, the Lucas Court's perspective "suppresses the
ways in which one castle can be used to invade another." Singer, supra note 36, at
317-18; cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 142 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
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from the majority's perspective, the liberty of the claimant is pitted
against the anti-liberty exploits of the state. According to the Lucas
majority's understanding of property-as-liberty, at least where an
owner's options are curtailed in their entirety by the state absent
compensation, the owner often is the victimized transferee of wealth
and the state is the antagonistic transferor.' On this view, the more the
legal system protects property from the state's regulatory exploits, the
freer individuals will be. Liberty thus serves as the starting point for
crafting and maintaining a fair and just property regime. In those
exceptional cases where regulation proves unavoidable for pragmatic
purposes, liberty can be respected (albeit in a second-best sort of way)
through the payment of compensation to those owners whose liberty is
curtailed as a result of that regulation.
B. Property-as-Liberty: A Critical Normative Assessment
Many individual constitutional rights-such as speech, association,
religious exercise, and equal protection-can be considered "public
goods" in the sense that (i) one person's "consumption" of those
"goods" (i.e., exercise of those rights) generally does not detract from
consumption by others, and (ii) no person can be easily prevented from
enjoying them.47 As constitutional public goods, these rights generally
can be protected against interference by the state.' The conception of
property underlying the Lucas majority opinion rests on the assumption
that property rights are among these constitutional public goods in
providing a barrier of protection against the government's wishes.49
Conceiving of property as a constitutional public good is what
Professor Jennifer Nedelsky has described as a powerful and quite
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) (distinguishing between self-regarding and other-
regarding acts in asserting that "[e]ncroachment on [others'] rights; infliction on them
of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights . . . are fit objects of moral
reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment").
46. Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View
of Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 749-50 (2004).
47. Of course, scholars have raised the prospect of critical exceptions. See,
e.g., Charles R. Lawrence IH, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 447, 452, 470 (suggesting that, given hate-speech's
propensity to silence its critics, the government's non-interference with one's claim to
freely speak hate interferes with another's claim to free speech).
48. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1033, 1039 (1996) [hereinafter Underkuffler-Freund, Special
Right] ("[Ulpon granting one person the right to speak, there is no necessary taking of
that same right from another."); Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights "Trump?"
An Examination of Speech and Property, 52 ME. L. REv. 311, 316 (2000).
49. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7
(1992) (referring to "a rich tradition of protection [of property] at common law").
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commonplace "psychological experience."" In actuality, though,
property rights are distinct from constitutional public goods in several
important respects." Unlike the subjects of these other rights, the
resources to which property is directed are limited and often cannot
readily be shared.5 2 If the state allocates to one party a right, for
example, to control the use of land, that right (and those attendant to it)
is denied to all others. Though possible in the context of constitutional
public goods, it is not possible in the property context to distinguish
between protection against government interference and government
obligations to interfere." Not only is there no right to be left alone
when it comes to property but there is no way to be left alone.
Recognizing one person's claim to a limited, non-shareable resource
50. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 250 (1990); see also John Humbach, What is Behind the "Property
Rights" Debate?, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 23 (1993) ("The basic claim of the
property-rights advocates . . . is a claim founded on deeply rooted ideas ringing of
basic fairness: 'What's mine is mine.'"). Kevin Gray suggests that lawmakers often
perpetuate this mythical idea by obscuring the reality of property's contingent nature.
Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, in 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 157, 159 (M.D.A.
Freeman & R. Halson eds., 1994) ("property is not theft but fraud").
51. The next several paragraphs draw in significant part from one of the
author's recent articles. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C.
L. REV. 145 (2018).
52. See, e.g., Underkuffler-Freund, Special Right, supra note 48, at 1039;
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 13 (1928).
Property's rivalrous nature helps explain John Locke's struggling to justify individual
appropriations of nature's commons, for such appropriations would deprive all others
of their pre-existing rights to those commons. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive
Property Moving Forward, 5 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 349, 360 n.47 (2014).
53. Property is, in this way, paradoxical: Many Americans have a deep
personal feeling that property should be very strongly protected, but there is no way
that it can be. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics of Property and Need, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 363, 370 (2010) ("No societally recognized and enforced
property right, which is 'normatively neutral,' actually exists."); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and Comparative Approach, in
PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 417, 427 (G.E. van Maanen
& A.J. van der Walt eds., 1996) ("[P]roperty implicates the very core issues of
politics: distributive justice and the allocation of power."); Eduardo M. Pefialver,
Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2971, 2974 (2006) ("When owners prove unwilling or unable to sort out
disagreements about . . . spillover effects on their own, the state [has] to make
decisions about which spillover effects owners must tolerate and which spillover-
creating actions they may not take . . . ."). But see Eric R. Claeys, Kelo, The Castle,
and Natural Property Rights, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 35, 47 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) ("In all but the most extreme
cases, . . . the natural law refrains from picking and choosing among owners or land
uses.").
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unavoidably detracts from-and thus unavoidably interferes with-
consumption of that resource by others.5
Concentrating on the liberty of the claimant owner thus directs
attention to just one side of the coin. While it is certainly the case that
property can enhance specific varieties of liberty, it can do so only
upon the sacrifice of other varieties." Some varieties are specific, while
others are general. For an example of a specific variety of liberty,
recognizing a property right to intensive use of sensitive oceanfront
lands in South Carolina clearly advances Mr. Lucas's liberty. However,
this effort comes at the expense of curtailing the liberty interests of the
many others who will be directly and indirectly impacted by this
choice. In advancing Mr. Lucas's liberty, the liberty of those owners
and non-owners reliant on land, personal, and infrastructural resources
that Mr. Lucas's development will put at risk is sacrificed.56 Of the
more general varieties of liberty, advancing Mr. Lucas's liberty comes
at the expense of the collective's affirmative liberty to engage with each
other in self-governance to preserve sensitive lands for the protection of
both present and future generations. If collective action restricting
coastal development is authorized but only upon the payment of
compensation, the collective's liberty in doing what it will with its
money is infringed, given that the taxes used to make such a payment
generally are paid involuntarily." In distilled form, and distinct from a
54. See ERIc T. FREYFOGLE, A GOOD THAT TRANSCENDS: How U.S.
CULTURE UNDERMINES ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM 112-34 (2017) (explaining that, in
such an instance, property rights do not increase overall but rather are "simply
reconfigured").
55. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 75, 84-91 (2010). It is conceivable that one's property claim would not
necessarily interfere with another's claim if land were infinitely abundant and there
were no barriers to entry to property ownership, as John Locke once famously if
inaccurately imagined the American West. For a critique of Locke's assumptions about
there being "enough, and as good" common land left for others, see, for example,
MyrI L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role
for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095 (1996). Then
again, if land were infinitely abundant and there were no barriers to entry to property
ownership, the social benefits of fashioning and administering a property regime in land
are not altogether obvious.
56. The point is even clearer on the unusual facts of a well-known Iowa case.
In Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a statute that
immunized from nuisance suits those property owners who put their land to use as
controlled animal feeding operations unjustly and unfairly deprived these owners'
neighbors of property absent compensation. 584 N.W.2d 309, 319-22 (Iowa 1998). To
would-be controlled animal feeding operators, the statute removed a substantial restriction
infringing upon a use to which they sought to put their land. Yet to the neighbors the
statute imposed a substantial restriction upon a non-harmful use to which they already had
put their land. See Mulvaney, supra note 51, at 176-77.
57. See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1
REv. CONST. STUD. 1, 5 (1993).
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world in which the might of physical power rules the day, property
represents the legal power to constrain the liberties of others regardless
of their physical prowess. 18 Respecting Mr. Lucas's liberty by arming
him with the power to halt interferences with his preferred land use has
adverse consequences for the liberty of those who favor competing
uses, just as arming others with the power to halt Mr. Lucas's favored
uses would have adverse consequences for Mr. Lucas's liberty.
Given that there are liberties on both sides of the coin, someone
must choose which varieties of liberty to enhance and which to restrain.
Who decides whether the law protects sensitive uses or authorizes
intensive ones?59 Who decides whether the law protects against flooding
or authorizes the filling of wetlands?' Who decides whether the law
requires that a landlord mitigate her damages when a tenant walks out
on a lease or allows that landlord to sit idly by and later sue for all back
rent?61 In our constitutional democracy, individuals have exercised their
affirmative liberty to organize and cooperate in pursuit of mutually
shared goals on these and myriad other topics. In so doing, they have
vested the authority to make these choices about which varieties of
liberty to enhance and which to restrain in the hands of their political
representatives (i.e., the state). Property, therefore, is not inimical to
state decision-making, as the Lucas majority insinuated-it is the
product of it. State decisions necessarily will respect certain liberties
and simultaneously constrain others over time. Contrary to a major
assumption of the majority's property-as-liberty view, all key issues of
property law have not already been decided in perpetuity. Respected
liberties are not a pre-established and immutable touchstone of defining
and allocating property interests; rather, they are an outcome of this
democratic process of making policy choices among the varying
potential answers to difficult questions through the formulation of
property laws in the face of new circumstances and information.6 2
58. Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv.
357, 373 (1954) ("[PIroperty is a relationship among human beings such that the so-
called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit others to engage in
those activities and in either case secure the assistance of the law in carrying out his
decision.") (emphasis added).
59. Compare Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), with
Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
60. Compare Palazzolo v. Rhode Island ex rel. Tavares, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I.
2001) (mem.), with Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994), abrogated by Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
61. Compare Wright v. Bauman, 398 P.2d 119 (Or. 1965), with Somer v.
Kridel, 378 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1977).
62. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Security and Equality of Property, in
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 39, 52 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Univ.
of Toronto Press 1978) (1802) ("Property and law are born together, and die together.
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These policy choices of state decision-makers are, in a democracy,
tied on the whole to the electorate's predilections." Naturally, these
predilections vary over time and from one generation to the next.64
American history, though spanning less than 250 years, is rife with
examples of marked shifts in the collective's predilections. For
instance, prior to the Industrial Revolution, a sensitive land user's
liberty outweighed the liberty of one who later came along seeking to
intensify her land use in a manner that would interrupt her neighbor's
tranquility; as industrialization gained momentum, however, the liberty
of the intensive user came to trump the quiet enjoyment of her
neighbors. Reflecting this trend, the Oregon Supreme Court described
wetlands in 1922 in the following terms: "The interest of the people of
this state demands that as far as possible all of the swamps, marshes,
swales, and wet land that can be successfully and conveniently drained
and reclaimed should be permitted so to be treated . . . ."6 Not fifty
Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.").
But see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1849, 1851 (2007) (suggesting that, contra Bentham, a property regime
cannot operate without a moral grounding that is disconnected from law, though
without explaining what a "widely accepted," "simple," and "robust" underlying
morality is or how it might be identified without tending to the impacts that one's use of
property has on others).
63. Freyfogle, supra note 55, at 103 ("[W]e cannot even take a single step in
the direction of constructing a property rights scheme based on the idea of property
without immediately having to make policy choices."). It would be peculiar, then, to
task the judiciary, through the Takings Clause, with conducting a probing review of
every such policy choice made by the political body tasked with making those choices.
See Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property, Natural
Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171, 196
(1995).
64. Id. (" [P]roperty ought to be defined in ways that will produce the kind of
society we want.").
65. Freyfogle, supra note 55, at 87. Professor Freyfogle offers a number of
additional examples. See, e.g., id. at 88-90 (discussing a nineteenth century shift in
some jurisdictions away from protecting the liberty of hunters to enter unenclosed
private lands and toward a private right to exclude); id. at 91-95 (outlining the
principles that drove Irish land law in the twelfth century to demonstrate the range of
choices lawmakers have in deciding whose liberty to protect and whose liberty to
constrain).
66. Harbison v. City of Hillsboro, 204 P. 613, 618 (Or. 1922); see also H.G.
WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS;
INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 505 (San Francisco, Bancroft-
Whitney Co. 3d ed. 1893) (observing in the late 1800s that "[w]here water lies upon the
surface of the ground in wet, swampy places, and extends even over the lands of
several proprietors, but has not taken to itself the qualities of a stream so as to become
a water-course, any owner of such lands may, by drains or other artificial means,
exhaust the water and redeem his land from its swampy condition"); William B.
Meyer, When Dismal Swamps Became Priceless Wetlands, AM. HERITAGE, May-June
1994, http://www.americanheritage.com/content/when-dismal-swamps-became-
priceless-wetlands [https://perma.cc/2883-HB33].
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years later, however, the pendulum swung back when, by a vote of
247-23, the U.S. House of Representatives overrode President Nixon's
veto to pass federal legislation strongly protective of wetlands, casting
aside builders' once-respected liberty to obliterate what had come to be
recognized as precious natural resources.67 This legislation, known
colloquially as the Clean Water Act, remains in force today," alongside
air quality, zoning, banking, leasing, antidiscrimination, and countless
other property regulations that deprive some parties of liberty."
If property creates a pre-political, formally defined, and static
sphere of individual liberty that generally should be deemed legally
resistant to the government's interference through the enactment and
enforcement of limitations on possession, transfer, and use, why do all
of these regulations reflecting the evolving choices of modem society
exist? Their existence sheds light on how property law operates in real
terms, and simultaneously reveals the chinks in the armor of the
property-as-liberty view underlying the Lucas majority opinion. These
regulations are not, in fact, exclusively pro-liberty or anti-liberty.
Rather, they are extensions of individual owners' liberties. They protect
certain individuals' liberties against new and undesirable uses of
property that would infringe on those liberties, though necessarily at the
weighty expense of the liberty of others.70 There is absolutely no
system of private property that could avoid all such sacrifices.
Property consists of a body of laws-constitutional provisions,
statutes, administrative rules and standards, local ordinances, and
common law-that (i) instruct people on how they can use resources
and on the types of resource-related relationships that are consistent
with a free and democratic society, and (ii) inform owners which
governmental decisions among those they perceive as interferences with
their ownership they can complain about in a legal proceeding and
which they cannot. These laws-these regulations-decide which
liberties will be protected and which liberties will be sacrificed.
Property, without law, cannot tell a hiker that she is at liberty to
traverse undeveloped, privately-owned countryside or, instead, that the
67. See Annie Snider, Clean Water Act: Vetoes by Eisenhower, Nixon
Presaged Today's Partisan Divide, E&E NEWS (October 18, 2012),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059971457 [https://perma.cc/3KJH-EXXC].
68. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012). Debate around
the law's jurisdictional reach no doubt continues, but that debate centers not on
obviously ecologically valuable wetlands adjacent to waters that are navigable in fact
but instead on whether the law's protections are applicable to hydrologically isolated
sloughs, prairie potholes, and the like. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715 (2006).
69. See Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIo N.U.
L. REv. 601, 605 (2015).
70. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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private owner of that countryside is at liberty to exclude that hiker
without the trouble of justifying it." Property, without law, cannot tell
a long-time resident that she is at liberty to curb the fumes emanating
from a new neighboring factory or, instead, that the private owner of
that factory is at liberty to emit those fumes.72 There is, to crib from the
title of a recent provocative book on the subject, "no freedom without
regulation." 7 1 Property law undoubtedly will protect liberty, but which
varieties of liberty it will protect are not self-evident.
The property-as-liberty view espoused in Lucas, therefore, is not
in actuality reliant on liberty as a defining principle, for this principle
does not explain whose liberty to promote and whose liberty to curtail.
Instead, the property-as-liberty view packages within the ideal of
"liberty" at least two substantive assumptions. First, this view gives a
specific, constricting content to liberty. It exalts the negative liberty to
be free from the collective governance of others and derides the
positive liberty to freely engage in such governance. Moreover, and
relatedly, it conceives of this negative liberty as freedom from the state
itself, but not from individuals. Thus, Mr. Lucas's liberty to be free
from the collective governance of others via the state legislature's
Beachfront Management Act features prominently in the Court's
opinion, while there is nary a mention of the others whose liberty to
engage in their preferred land uses or cooperate in an effort to promote
a safe and secure place in which to live, work, and recreate Mr.
Lucas's development activities will constrain. The property-as-liberty
view overlooks the reality that disregarding the liberty of others is not a
neutral stance but instead a choice that confers on Mr. Lucas substantial
state power. A legal interpretation that confers this power on Mr. Lucas
amounts to a state decision that allocates property interests just as
would a legal interpretation that conferred power on others to halt Mr.
Lucas's planned development.
Second, the property-as-liberty view underlying the majority
opinion in Lucas rested on the assumption that nature is the exclusive
subject of the current inhabitants' authority.74 In the process, it
71. E.g., Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2016/18/pdfs/asp_20160018_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6HCQ-WDGQ] (colloquially known as the Scotland Right-To-Roam
Act). For an especially thoughtful exposition on shifting attitudes surrounding
landowners' exclusionary interests, see ERic T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY:
FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 29-61 (2007).
72. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
73. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, No FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION: THE
HIDDEN LESSON OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2015); see also Joseph William Singer, We
Don't Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 929, 950 (2015) ("Markets are free not because they are unregulated but
because they are open to all.").
74. See Sax, supra note 43.
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eschewed nature's ecological and generational-and thus property's-
interconnectedness. This eschewal allowed the Court to understand
nuisance law as limiting only those activities that present especially
significant and overtly visible harms or, in the Court's words, "grave
threats" to other owners' liberty .' Any more expansive conception of
nuisance law would be an affront to the property-as-liberty view
because it would limit the liberty of a current owner to intensively
develop her land.76 Only by disregarding both those other current
owners and non-owners who suffer less obvious harms and the future
generations that will inherit the landscape-two groups that the common
law of nuisance in actuality has served for centuries-can a system of
private property be deemed an automatic net gain for liberty. 7 Were
nuisance law-and property law more generally-understood instead as
involving a choice among competing claims to liberty, a party's plea to
liberty alone would not dictate whether that party's liberty should be
curtailed or enhanced. The Lucas majority's view ignores the reality
that, in most every property dispute, the liberty of some disputants will
be respected to the detriment of the liberty of others.
The property-as-liberty theory underlying the Lucas majority
opinion is commendable for recognizing that, in a constitutional
democracy, property serves the democratic value of individual
freedom. As applied in Lucas, it helpfully highlights several ways in
which property significantly enhances an owner's liberty by creating
and protecting the subject of her ownership. However, this theory
conceives of liberty far too narrowly. The Lucas Court understood the
only liberty at stake in assessing the state's coastal protection legislation
as that of Mr. Lucas. Yet private property protection, in operation,
imposes a colossal restriction on the liberty of the many others with
legitimate interests that would be impacted by Mr. Lucas's
development. The Lucas opinion fails to grapple with the wide-ranging
consequences for the liberty of all parties that result from the state's
allocation of property interests. More broadly, it brushes aside
democratic values beyond liberty that our property system serves. As
the next Part explains, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the Lucas
judgment similarly rests on a conception of property centered on a
singular value.
75. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992).
76. Admittedly, the Court did not conceive of nuisance law as narrowly as
others had advocated. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 120-25, 230-38 (1985).
77. Freyfogle, supra note 55, at 102.
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III. PROPERTY-AS-INVESTMENT
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the Lucas judgment is grounded
in the view that the institution of property exists not to serve the value
of liberty but instead that of industry. The first section below outlines
this property-as-investment conception through the lens of Justice
Kennedy's concurrence. The second section exposes this conception of
property to normative critique. It concludes that, like the property-as-
liberty conception, the property-as-investment conception fails to
wrestle with the plurality of what are at times incommensurable values
with which law-makers ought to be concerned in attempting to allocate
property interests in a manner that is fair and just absent compensation.
A. Conceiving of Property as Investment
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the Lucas judgment that, as he
described it, the Beachfront Management Act "may have deprived [Mr.
Lucas] of the use of his land in an interim period."" In lieu of the
libertarian conception of property underlying Justice Scalia's majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence rests on a utilitarian approach
to property. Under Justice Scalia's approach, decisions surrounding the
use of property are not the prerogative of the regulatory state except in
those narrow instances in which such decisions traditionally have been
considered by the common law to negatively and substantially impact
the liberty of others to do what they will with their property; at least
where a regulation deprives property of all economically viable uses,
the state's police power to limit property uses to prevent harm or
otherwise promote the public welfare is relinquished."9 To the contrary,
under Justice Kennedy's approach, decisions surrounding the use of
property are the prerogative of the regulatory state when justified based
on the extent to which they advance the public welfare.80 To Justice
Kennedy, the extent to which a regulation advances the public welfare
is largely dependent on its aligning with the affected owners' legitimate
economic expectations that relate to and inform financial outlay
decisions. He wrote that the Takings Clause "protects private
expectations to ensure private investment."8
78. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
80. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Where a taking
is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test must be
whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations. . ..
The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response
to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever
their source.").
81. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
930
Property-as-Society
While facilitating investment and the resulting productivity is at
most an incidental byproduct of the property-as-liberty conception, it is
the guiding light of the property-as-investment conception. The root of
this economic claim is a familiar one: A private property system
incentivizes behavior that both diversifies and enlarges the amount of
resources available for consumption and increases the value of those
resources. In turn, more and more valuable resources are available to
satisfy individuals' consumption preferences in the aggregate. Justice
Kennedy's approach bears markers of Professor Frank Michelman's
famous "demoralization" theory of takings, which focuses on the
impact of the state's failure to compensate on the investment decisions
of non-compensated owners and their sympathizers.82 Professor
Michelman's theory-and, in turn, that underlying Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in the Lucas judgment-can be traced to Jeremy Bentham,
who included among the various "evils" of assaults on property rights
the "deadening of industry." 83 The property-as-investment view
suggests that takings compensation should be due when a claimant
sustains significant losses via regulation to avoid dis-incentivizing the
pursuit of economic investments and the productivity of in-demand
goods and services that results therefrom.
This property-as-investment conception leaves the state's enacting
and enforcing regulatory safeguards that do not necessarily mirror
traditional common law principles free from constitutional takings
liability so long as they do not disrupt those reasonable and justified
economic investments of the individually affected owner. While Justice
Scalia's opinion expressed confidence that owners traditionally have the
freedom to determine whether to build a home on a single lot, Justice
Kennedy's approach requires an exercise in judgment by asking
whether this particular owner was justified in the expectation that she
could build a home on this particular lot in these particular
circumstances.' On this latter view, many regulatory reallocations of
property are appropriate. However, where such a reallocation of
82. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214-
15 (1967). Professor Michelman advocated limiting takings liability to situations in
which the costs of the state's paying compensation to offset "demoralization" are not
outweighed by the costs of identifying the affected parties, a point on which Justice
Kennedy did not opine. See id., at 1215.
83. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 70-73 (Richard Hildreth ed. & trans., N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd. &
Oceana Publ'ns, Inc. 1975) (1802).
84. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Supreme Court
of South Carolina erred, in my view, by reciting the general purposes for which the
state regulations were enacted without a determination that they were in accord with the
owner's reasonable expectations and therefore sufficient to support a severe restriction
on specific parcels of property. ").
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property interests unduly impedes the assumed purposes of a property
regime-investment and the resulting production-compensation is
appropriate.
More faithfully than the majority, Justice Kennedy left open the
ultimate question of whether a taking occurred in Lucas. On the
property-as-investment conception underlying Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, one might well contend that Mr. Lucas's expectation to
build a home on his two lots in these circumstances was justified on the
following grounds: Mr. Lucas bought the land when the law allowed
such development; the construction of a home would not by itself cause
a customarily significant harm to others; and, unlike ordinary zoning
rules," the legislation here did not generate any meaningful reciprocal
benefits for Mr. Lucas given that his neighbors all already were
allowed to do what is suddenly now, to him, proscribed. In this sense,
the prohibition on development unjustifiably caught Mr. Lucas by
surprise, and to allow it to go uncompensated would chill investment
and productivity moving forward.
However, a strong case could be made for just the opposite
conclusion on the property-as-investment conception. Perhaps Mr.
Lucas's expectation to build a home on these lots in these circumstances
was unreasonable, given that, considering new knowledge surrounding
the coastal environment, it is evident that Mr. Lucas's situation was
distinct from that of his neighbors who already had developed their
lands. While construction of a home may well have been an innocent
use in such an erosion-prone coastal zone in a prior or even recent age,
today such an act has come to resemble an unjustifiable and, indeed,
irresponsible intrusion into the previous investments by Mr. Lucas's
neighbors. This claim is all the more powerful when one considers that,
according to one prominent coastal lands expert, Mr. Lucas's lots were
at the time of the case two of just six lots among the hundreds of
oceanfront lots along the barrier island where erosion was especially
severe. 8 6
In further support of rejecting Mr. Lucas's takings claim on the
property-as-investment view, South Carolina's coastline had been
subjected to extensive regulation for more than thirty years when Mr.
Lucas acquired his lots.8 Perhaps he should have forecasted the
possibility of new, more stringent regulations, rather than relying
blindly on the view that, having purchased the lots prior to the formal
promulgation of these more stringent regulations, he was immune from
85. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 387-90 (1926).
86. See Professor Josh Eagle, Panel Speaker at the University of South
Carolina School of Law Conference on Takings and Coastal Management: Coastal
Management after Lucas (Nov. 3, 2017).
87. Sax, supra note 43, at 1434.
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their application for all time absent compensation.8 8 On this view, it is
not welfare enhancing to encourage investments in property without
concern for the possibility that scientific advancements, and the laws
based on the revelations of those advancements, might change. South
Carolina made no promises to Mr. Lucas (or anyone else) that he could
construct a home on privately-owned property in perpetuity. This risk-
the possibility that reasonably foreseeable regulations will be adopted to
protect the public from direct or cumulative harms-is part and parcel
of the very idea of investment.
B. Property-as-Investment: A Critical Normative Assessment
The preceding section explains that Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in the Lucas judgment centers on a value that is only tangential to the
conception of property underlying the majority opinion-the value of
industry-by conceiving of property as a tool of economic investment.
The benefits of property's incentivizing, or, perhaps more directly,
rewarding, behavior that enlarges the amount and value of resources
available for consumption can be distilled into the simple and
undeniable assertion that human survival-let alone human
flourishing-depends on the production of such resources. However,
the mere investment and production of resources available for
consumption does not alone serve the end of promoting human survival.
Serving this end also requires concern for the distribution of these
resources.
Like the property-as-liberty view, conceiving of property-as-
investment emphasizes the self-interested nature of property and
conceives of the relevant interests of others in narrow terms. On the
property-as-investment view, there is limited regard for the extent to
which property owners, in light of their status as owners, owe
responsibilities to their communities to keep those communities alive
and functioning in a decent and just order.89 While the property-as-
investment view does not mandate an immediate and strict reciprocity
of advantage on each party negatively impacted by a new regulatory
safeguard (which, in the words of Professor Richard Epstein, amounts
88. Even if South Carolina nuisance and property law, as historically
construed, did not explicitly prohibit Mr. Lucas's proposed construction, they did not
explicitly authorize it, either. See Michelman, supra note 33, at 316-18.
89. See Lynda L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 BROOK.
L. REV. 1215, 1220-21 (2017) (critiquing conceptions of property that lack "an
outward-regarding perspective that encompasses a broader sense of responsibility for
the impacts of property use on society and nature, and that recognizes the role of
collective action in managing the exercise of property rights").
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to proper "implicit in-kind compensation"),' it requires a still-
demanding version of an "average" reciprocity of advantage. 91 To
proponents of the property-as-investment view, determining whether
such an average reciprocity of advantage exists requires an economic
comparison of the disparity between the pre-regulation economic
burden distribution and the post-regulation economic burden
distribution through the claimant investor's eyes. 92 The property-as-
investment theory does not leave space to rationalize reallocations that
depress investment without compensation on the grounds that the less
fortunate in our communities deserve the economic means to improve
their circumstances and that the more fortunate among us have an
obligation to alleviate our neighbors' suffering by providing such
means.9 Only those reallocations that do not unduly discourage
investment into the production of goods and services that people who
already have spending power want to purchase are immunized from
takings law's compensation principle.
According to the property-as-investment conception, industry is
not one of a plurality of values that at times might give way to other
values. Instead, it is the driving value with which law-makers ought to
be concerned in considering whether contemplated allocations of
90. EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 195. The author of the Lucas opinion, Justice
Scalia, has echoed Professor Epstein's call for a narrow understanding of reciprocal
advantages in numerous takings opinions. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 18-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (preventing the state from imposing permit
conditions that do not offset a harm directly attributable to the development authorized
by the permit). Professor Peter Byrne insightfully illuminates this aspect of Justice
Scalia's takings jurisprudence in a recent article. See J. Peter Byrne, A Hobbesian
Bundle of Lockean Sticks: The Property Rights Legacy of Justice Scalia, 41 VT. L. REV.
733, 754 (2017) ("Property rules are frequently tempered by equity, which may
generously consider the circumstances of the parties. Statutory eviction rules contain
protections for elderly people and people subject to cold weather. Scalia's concept of
property would render anything of this nature unconstitutional because it imposes duties
on lessors for tenant problems not caused by the lessor.") (citation omitted). Of course,
a stronger libertarian perspective would preclude the state from appropriating property
for public uses even upon the payment of just compensation.
91. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
92. Most modern discussions on reciprocal advantages in takings cases rely,
if implicitly, on several opinions of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
See, e.g., Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. at 544-45 (1914) (finding a
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the extraction of coal along property boundaries did not
amount to a compensable taking because all affected mine owners would be reciprocally
benefitted); Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (concluding that a Pennsylvania statute requiring
mine owners to keep coal in place to prevent surface subsidence did not secure the mine
owners an "average reciprocity of advantage" but rather redistributed value from the
mine owners to the surface owners).
93. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in
COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223, 238-39 (John W. Chapman ed., Nomos Ser. No. 33,
1991).
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property interests are fair and just absent compensation. As explained
in the next Part, the property-as-society conception underlying the
dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in Lucas does not
dismiss the type of inquiry regarding the legitimacy of one's
expectations respecting economic investments that Justice Kennedy's
approach highlights. Instead, the property-as-society view clarifies and
pluralizes that inquiry's focus from one centered on promoting
economic investment to one appreciative of a full range of democratic
values.
IV. PROPERTY-AS-SOCIETY
In separate though complementary dissents in Lucas, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens rely, if tacitly, on a social understanding of
property as serving a plurality of democratic values, including, but not
limited to, liberty and industry. The first section below draws on these
dissenting opinions to articulate this property-as-society conception.
The second section makes the normative case that the property-as-
society view provides an appropriately comprehensive framework for
evaluating takings cases that is superior to that of the property-as-
liberty and property-as-investment conceptions.
A. Conceiving of Property as Society
Justices Blackmun and Stevens chastised the majority for asserting
that circumstances exist in which public interests are irrelevant to the
question of whether private property deserves constitutional protection
from state adjustment.94 They read Justice Scalia's opinion to disregard
a premise that, in the words of Justice Blackmun, "until today [was]
unassailable-that the state has the power to prevent any use of property
it finds to be harmful to its citizens. "9 The dissenters highlighted the
94. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047 (1992) (Blackmun
J., dissenting). Though they had vastly different perspectives on how the case should be
resolved, Professor Epstein agreed with Justice Blackmun on this basic point. See
Epstein, supra note 16, at 1249 ("Lucas argues that as long as the taking is total, the
question of justification need not be considered at all. Yet no balanced theory of takings
could be that protective of private property against the legitimate claims of the state.").
95. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1039, 1047-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing a
long line of Supreme Court cases upholding regulations designed to prevent harm
despite those regulations' destroying or adversely affecting private property interests,
including Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678 (1888); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489 n.18
(1987)); see also id. at 1064 (Stevens J., dissenting) (asserting, with citations to many
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fact that the statute at issue included procedures through which Mr.
Lucas could challenge the location of the setback line. Had he proven
through this process that development of his land would not cause
harm, it would have been appropriate for the state to adjust the line
and, therefore, eliminate the development prohibition's applicability to
Mr. Lucas.96 Yet Mr. Lucas did not pursue such a challenge and, thus,
to Justices Blackmun and Stevens, did not meet his burden of proof.'
According to the dissenters, the majority inexplicably shifted the
burden to the state to convince the courts that the legislature's
findings-here, that "serious harm to life and property" was likely to
result if permanent structures were erected on Mr. Lucas's oceanfront
lots-were both correct and consistent with the principles of common
law nuisance as traditionally construed. 98
The dissents disputed the Court's perspective that the worth of the
state's claim on remand-that its regulation will prevent harmful uses
traditionally proscribed by the common law-can be evaluated on a
"value-free basis."" To Justices Blackmun and Stevens, there is no
single principle of nuisance or any other law that mechanically
classifies uses of property as harmful or not for all time. Property,
instead, is a social craft that serves social ends. On this property-as-
society view, property is composed of an adaptive body of principles-
"background" principles and foreground principles-that exists in
service of the common needs and interests of the collective, as those
needs and interests evolve over time."
of the cases to which Justice Blackmun referred, that "[w]e have frequently-and
recently-held that, in some circumstances, a law that renders property valueless may
nonetheless not constitute a taking").
96. Id. at 1042-43 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1042 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1046 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1053-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1026 (majority
opinion)).
100. See id. at 1070 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (calling, in takings cases, for a
"focus on the future, not the past"); id. at 1037 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
country has come to recognize that uncontrolled beachfront development can cause
serious damage to life and property. . . . [B]eachfront buildings are not only themselves
destroyed [in major coastal storms], but they are often driven, like battering rams, into
adjacent inland homes. Moreover, the development often destroys natural sand dune
barriers that provide storm breaks." (internal citations and quotations omitted)); see
also Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 GEO. MASON L. REv. 837
(2013). At the time of the Lucas decision in 1992, South Carolina had been a U.S. state
for over 200 years and thus had a fairly developed body of common law. It is unclear
whether the Lucas majority would have advocated its constrictive "background
principles" distinction had the dispute arisen in, say, Hawaii or Alaska, which were
granted statehood just three decades prior and thus had very embryonic bodies of
common law.
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Property is, in Justice Stevens's words, "elastic.""' Its elasticity
stems from the institution's status as an endlessly developing product of
education. Wrote Justice Stevens: "The human condition is one of
constant learning and evolution-both moral and practical. Legislatures
implement that new learning; in doing so they must often revise the
definition of property and the rights of property owners. "02 To the
dissenters, where there is a plausible justification for a generally
applicable revision of property rights that results from such "constant
learning," compensation is inapposite.103 Justice Stevens pointed to
perhaps the most obvious instantiation of this tenet: That state, and later
federal, prohibitions on slavery appropriated from slave holders
property of immense market value without compensation did not signify
a disregard for property rights; instead, it reflected the collective view
that a master's holding power over fellow human beings in such a
regard had become immoral and that such relations therefore would no
longer be legally recognized. He noted that, " [o]n a lesser scale, our
ongoing self-education produces similar changes in the rights of
property owners: New appreciation of the significance of endangered
species; the importance of wetlands; and the vulnerability of coastal
lands shapes our evolving understandings of property rights." 105
Fairness and justice necessarily require not a value-free conclusion, as
the Lucas majority suggested, but value-laden judgment in allocating
resources in the face of competing claims.
B. Property-as-Society: A Critical Normative Assessment
The property-as-society view underlying the complementary
dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens does not reject the promise
101. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1072 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Edward L. Rubin, The
Illusion of Property as a Right and Its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative, 2013 Wis. L.
REv. 573, 602 ("to protect individuals against government oppression, it is necessary to
provide that an individual cannot be harmed unless the political process has determined
that a larger group should be subject to such treatment and that the particular individual
belongs to the group").
104. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Eric T.
Freyfogle, Property Law in a Time of Transformation: The Record of the United States,
S. AFR. L.J. 883, 913 (2014) (explaining the lack of compensation to former
slaveholders by noting that, on an instrumentalist view of property law, "it made no
sense to pay to halt immorality"); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONsT.
COMMENT. 239, 248 (1990) (asking, rhetorically, in 1990, "should the Czechs purchase
the right to free elections from the Communist Party?"); Sax, supra note 43, at 1446
("Historically, property definitions have continuously adjusted to reflect new economic
and social structures, often to the disadvantage of existing owners . . . .").
105. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
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of liberalism, be it grounded in liberty simply for liberty's sake or out
of concern for promoting investment. Yet while the dissenters interpret
that promise to allow owners to act self-interestedly, they also
understand it to disallow owners from acting in ways that the collective
now views as anarchic.1" This view shifts the emphasis in resolving
property disputes from the accommodation of self-interest (as the
property-as-liberty and property-as-investment views would have it) to
the proscription against acting anarchically in the sense that it sees the
prospect of subjecting owners to fair and just responsibilities toward
their fellow citizens as perfectly compatible with-indeed, as an
essential element of-a property system in a democracy. Owners of the
resources on which humans rely are not merely individualistic decision-
makers or investors. They also are trustees of those resources essential
for humankind's survival and flourishment in the years, decades, and
centuries ahead.'o
The property-as-society view transparently recognizes that it is not
possible to protect the claimed entitlements or expectations of everyone.
Property (most notably land) is interdependent, and the uses of it
necessarily and directly, if at times only cumulatively, harm or
displease others. Whether lawmakers' allocative choices in the face of
this interdependence are "fair" and "just" absent compensation-the
ultimate question in a takings case-thus cannot be assessed through the
lens of a hypothetical self-regarding individual claimant but instead
must be accomplished via a relational analysis. Lucas necessarily
involved not solely a democratic choice regarding the landowner's
interest in developing two parcels but also the important competing
interests of those owners and non-owners who would be harmed by that
choice. Conceived in this way, a land use regulation of the sort at issue
in Lucas can well be understood as a choice that takes away Mr.
Lucas's development "rights" or as one that deprives Mr. Lucas and
other similarly situated persons of the "rights" they previously had to
harm others."o' The state cannot extract itself from making an allocative
choice that either Mr. Lucas's interest and that of similarly situated
owners includes the liberty to put his neighbors and the public at risk of
106. Singer, supra note 36, at 329-30; see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) ("Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and
validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.").
107. See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 821, 876
(2009) ("Because humans are physical beings, land is an essential component of virtually
every human activity."). While Dean Pefialver made this claim in writing exclusively
about land, the same claim naturally applies to myriad other resources, too.
108. See Humbach, supra note 50, at 25.
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harm or that the neighbors' and the public's interests include security
against such harm."
Society, of course, cannot impose any old responsibilities on
property owners-for harm-prevention or otherwise-that it chooses.
Rather, as noted, the Takings Clause requires that the imposition of
those responsibilities occur in a fair and just manner absent
compensation. Precedent suggests that the imposition of some
responsibilities that are fair and just absent compensation involve the
owner's exercise of restraint. For instance, an owner should avoid
using her land in ways that unjustifiably debase others' use and
enjoyment of their lands."o Others, though, involve affirmative
requirements."' For instance, a coastal landowner may be asked,
without the promise of compensation, to provide the state access to her
land to conduct dune maintenance or to the public to facilitate their use
and enjoyment of the water and the foreshore that the state holds in
trust for, among other values, its recreational significance.112 These
types of responsibilities are not secondary to an owner's property rights
but instead are an intrinsic characteristic of the very concept of
ownership. Property's offering legal protection against impediments to
109. See Isaac Saidel-Goley & Joseph William Singer, Things Invisible to See:
State Action and Private Property, 5 TEX. A&M L. REv. 439, 487-88 (2018) ("Either
an owner has the right to eject a homeless person from his property or the homeless
person has a right to enter the property to save his life. The state cannot fail to act in
cases like this; it must allocate the entitlement to someone and deny it to others; there is
simply no space within which the state can be said to not be acting."). But see Woods
v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. BACV200700099A, 2011 WL 7788022, at *6
(Mass. Super. Jan. 7, 2011) ("The Woodses do not allege that [the state's] shoreline
protection measures caused increased erosion of the Woodses' property . . . . The
Woodses contend that [the state] effected a taking by issuing permits . . . to private
owners . . . to defend their properties from wave action and by failing to enforce
certain conditions associated with these permits. As such, the allegations . . . fail to
state a claim under current law. . . . This case is best viewed as a dispute between
private parties.").
110. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 258 Cal. Rpt. 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1989).
111. See GREGORY ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 247
(2018).
112. See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879
A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.
1984). For detailed discussions of these beach access cases, see, for example, Gregory
S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REv. 745, 801-10 (2009); Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, Waterlocked: Public
Access to New Jersey's Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579 (2007).
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possession, transfer, and use is not absolute but instead is attentive to
the counterpoising societal interests of citizenship and neighborliness." 3
Because allocative choices must be made with societal interests in
mind,1 14 property cannot solely be defined in terms of an owner's rights
to liberty or to a return on economic investments without considering
an owner's responsibilities to, for example, consider the liberty and
economic investments of others."' Property surely offers private
advantages, but those private advantages must be compatible with the
public's advantage.' 16 The benefits of laws like those at issue in Lucas
that preserve the coastal zone through development restrictions are not,
as Justice Scalia once described them, "profits to [a] thief,""' but,
instead, are consequential effects that must be part of the decision-
making process when the state is allocating property rights in the face
of changing conditions. The Lucas majority confusingly feared the
possibility of "private property . . . being pressed into some form of
public service"' 18 when responsibly serving the public is precisely what
the institution of property is designed to do.1 9 As the California
Supreme Court would state it a decade after Lucas, reciprocity of
advantage lies
not in a precise balance of burdens and benefits accruing to
property from a single law, or in an exact equality of burdens
among all property owners, but in the interlocking system of
benefits, economic and noneconomic, that all the participants
in a democratic society may expect to receive, each also being
113. Underkuffler, supra note 46, at 729; see also ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE
LAND WE SHARE (2003); Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality and
Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 Loy. L. REv. 243 (2006).
114. See, e.g., C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY:
MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 1, 11-12 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978)
(asserting that property "is not thought to be a right because it is an enforceable claim:
it is an enforceable claim because it is thought to be a human right," such that "if it is
not so justified, it does not for long remain"); Andr6 van der Walt, Property Theory
and the Transformation of Property Law, in 3 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 361,
376 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2005) ("[A] transformative property theory has to be a
normative theory that justifies the balance between stability and change, in every
individual context, on consideration of human values.").
115. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, What Does the Constitutional
Protection of Property Mean?, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTs. CONF. J. 109, 114-15
(2016).
116. Sax, supra note 43, at 1453.
117. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasis omitted).
118. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
119. See Sax, supra note 43, at 1446 ("mhe Court fails to recognize that
lands in a state of nature are already in public service . . . .").
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called upon from time to time to sacrifice some advantage,
economic or noneconomic, for the common good.1 20
The foregoing suggests that takings adjudications should be
concerned not with whether a state decision presses property into public
service but rather the extent to which it applies that pressure in a way
that unfairly and unjustly isolates and sacrifices an individual owner's
property interest.121 State decisions routinely allocate contested property
interests. At a basic level, someone will win and someone will lose
when the state, as it must, makes such decisions: 122 In light of
property's allocative nature, asking someone to comply with generally-
applicable laws designed to promote the public interest through
reallocating the benefits and burdens of property ownership ordinarily
should not require compensation.123 in a democratic system, the
institution of property usually can demand only that the loser be offered
a justification that, however hard to swallow, should be accepted
without such payment by reasonable persons in her shoes under the
circumstances. Only when no such justification is available is affording
takings compensation to an individual property owner who has been
singled out appropriate.
This Part has presented a normative case that the conception of
property-as-society underlying Justices Blackmun's and Stevens's Lucas
dissents presents a more helpful structure for assessing the justificatory
nature of an allocative choice absent compensation than the property-as-
liberty and property-as-investment conceptions underlying,
respectively, Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in the judgment. This conception suggests that the
appropriate question in a case such as Lucas is not exclusively whether
the claimant, Mr. Lucas, was acting outside his broad realm of personal
concern in constructing a home (the property-as-liberty view) or
whether the state's failing to provide compensation to Mr. Lucas would
120. See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 108-10
(Cal. 2002).
121. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067, 1071-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "What
matters [in takings cases] is not the degree of diminution of value, but rather the
specificity of the expropriating act." Id.
122. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 90, at 758 ("No property rule can be
changed without eliminating somebody's established right."); Sax, supra note 43, at
1451 (1993) ("Certain individuals will inevitably be caught up in the transitional
moment" of "new legal regimes."); Rubin, supra note 103, at 601 (suggesting that, in a
system where "representatives are empowered to enact general rules governing the
society," such "rules will advantage some people at the expense of others").
123. The general applicability of the statute at issue in Lucas stems from its
restricting not only new development but also re-construction of existing development.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-08.
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chill economic investment moving forward (the property-as-investment
view). Instead, on the property-as-society view, the appropriate
question is whether the state's tasking Mr. Lucas with the responsibility
to refrain from putting the public, others' property, and the natural
environment at risk is fair and just absent compensation in an evolving
world of competing claims that serve competing values in which the
state has no option but to choose among them. The point of conceiving
of property on the terms outlined here is not to offer a definitive and
mechanical answer to this question on the facts of Lucas, but, rather, to
suggest that siding with Mr. Lucas requires sound and transparent
reasoning for rejecting the neighbors' and the greater public's
competing interests in the same way that siding with these competing
interests requires sound and transparent reasoning for siding against
Mr. Lucas's alleged interests. The next Part surveys the doctrinal
import of these competing conceptions in the twenty-five years since
Lucas was handed down, with a particular emphasis on the Court's
most recent takings opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin.
V. THE JURISPRUDENCE: COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY
The preceding pages have staked the following claims. First, the
property-as-liberty view underlying Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court in Lucas conceives of liberty through the narrow lens of the
takings claimant without sufficiently appreciating the extraordinary
impact that protection of claimed property rights can have on the liberty
of others. Second, the property-as-investment view underlying Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in the Lucas judgment, while offering a broader
outlook than that of the majority, is similarly concentrated on the
claimant's self-interest, not in liberty but industry. Third, the more
pluralistic property-as-society view underlying the respective dissents of
Justices Blackmun and Stevens in Lucas recognizes that property
allocations implicate a range of evolving and, at times, conflicting
democratic values, and thus offers the most useful framework and
vocabulary of the three for fairly and justly evaluating the competing
claims at stake in takings disputes.
This Part surveys the extent to which these competing conceptions
of property have been reflected in takings jurisprudence since the Court
issued its decision in Lucas in 1992, with special emphasis on the
Court's most recent takings decision in Murr v. Wisconsin. The
admittedly concise first section asserts that while the conception of
property-as-liberty enjoyed a welcome reception in several takings
cases in the decade immediately following Lucas, its influence has
waned in the past fifteen years. The lengthier second section suggests
that the remaining influence of this conception of property has been
checked significantly by the Court's sparsely veiled critique in its 2017
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decision in Murr. Indeed, in the course of engaging with the initial
scholarly reactions to Murr, the section contends that even the
dissenting opinion took issue with the rigidity of the property-as-liberty
view and, indeed, offered some doctrinal ammunition for defending
against takings claims that in several ways mirrors the property-as-
society view. Together, this Part concludes, the majority and dissenting
opinions in Murr illuminate the ascendance since Lucas of the property-
as-society view to a position of prominence in takings jurisprudence.
A. The Fading Influence of the Property-as-Liberty View
Prior to Lucas, the property-as-liberty view arguably played its
most prominent role in takings law in the matter of Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.'24 There, the Court held that
takings liability attaches where a regulation results in a forced,
permanent physical occupation of land by a stranger, regardless of the
public interests at stake. 125 Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the
Court that "permanent occupations of land by such installations as
telegraph and telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are
takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of
space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest
of his land."1 2 6 On its face, the holding could be construed as
suggesting that an owner's freedom to reject even the slightest
permanent physical occupation of her land by a stranger is a principal
interest so respected that it cannot ever be altered, even for an
exceedingly important public purpose, absent compensation.1 2 7
In time, though, Loretto has been exposed as a mere application of
Penn Central in cases in which one consideration-the forced,
permanent physical character of the third-party invasion required by the
state-weighs especially heavily in favor of the takings claimant.
Myriad examples indicate that, despite this heavy weight, the
importance of the public interest in the challenged regulation still
124. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
125. Id. at 432 (deeming "permanent physical occupation[s] . . . taking[s]
without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine").
126. Id. at 430.
127. It is possible to construe several of the Court's takings precedents as
recognizing other principal interests, including Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997)
(the right to pass property to others upon one's death); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987) (also discussing the right to pass property to others upon one's death); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding in a narrow
circumstance that the interest earned on the interpleader fund while it was in the
registry of the court was a taking violative of the Fifth Amendment); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding that the government's complete destruction
of a materialman's lien in certain property constituted a "taking"), though the Court has
not stated as much. See Singer, supra note 69, at 644-47.
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matters in applying Loretto, and, in some instances, is sufficient to
override any claim for compensation. For instance, Loretto did nothing
to disturb the Court's previously deeming justified without the
provision of compensation leaf-letting and public accommodations laws
establishing permanent public access easements.128 Simply describing
Loretto as advancing a broad categorical rule-in a case, no less,
involving the extremely rare instance of a regulation that not only
authorized strangers to use the titleholder's property but also precluded
the titleholder from using that property herself-can be somewhat
misleading.
To some, though, Lucas held the prospect of a more lasting
impact. According to two commentators remarking on the case shortly
after its release, Lucas laid the groundwork for the Court to deem in a
future case that "partial takings should be compensated no matter how
small." 29 Another explained that Lucas not only "enhanced the cause
of private property rights against oppressive regulatory actions" in
several ways but "may foretell yet additional advances for landowners'
rights" down the road.130 To yet another, Lucas suggested that the
nation was "en route to a new takings jurisprudence" in which the state
"would lose its power to regulate without counting its resources
available to pay compensation, even when it genuinely seeks to prevent
harm to life or property."131
128. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
129. See James W. Sanderson & Ann Mesmer, A Review of Regulatory
Takings After Lucas, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 497, 507 (1993); see also id. at 510
(describing Lucas as issuing to lower courts a "mandate to continue issuing decisions
that take less account of legitimate state interests in regulating and more account of a
loss in an owner's property value resulting from that regulation"); Paul M. Barrett,
Supreme Court Supports Rights of Landowners, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1992, at A3;
Commentary: No More 'Takings,' Please, ROCKY MouNTAIN NEWS, July 2, 1992, at
70; Don Elliott, Property Rights Ruling Recasts Land-Use Law, THE DENV. POST, July
18, 1992; Catherine Yang & Peter Hong, The Grass is Looking Greener for
Landowners, Bus. WK., July 13, 1992, at 31, 31 (asserting that Lucas "may be
ammunition for a new generation of regulation-fighting lawsuits that aim to push
beyond [this] Supreme Court ruling").
130. See John J. Delaney, Advancing Private Property Rights: The Lessons of
Lucas, 22 STETSON L. REv. 395, 395-96 (1993); see also John M. Groen & Richard
M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the Growth Management Act, 16 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 1259, 1300 (1993) (interpreting Lucas as portending "potential takings
resulting from Washington's Growth Management Act").
131. Bruce W. Burton, Regulatory Takings and the Shape of Things to Come:
Harbingers of A Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72 OR. L. REv. 603, 604-06, 656
(1993); see also Robert V. Percival, Murr v. Wisconsin and the Supreme Court's
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence 4-5 (Univ. of Md. Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 2018-04, 2017), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 3135424
[https://perma.cc/S2L5-E96H] (noting that, upon its release, "Lucas seemed to signal
an aggressive new posture for the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence that was
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For several years, there was some evidence that the Court
ultimately would prove these forecasts accurate by continuing to expand
the category of undeviating principal interests that cannot be impaired
absent compensation, irrespective of the public interest at stake. In
1997, the Court in Babbitt v. Youpeel3 2 found a restriction on the right
to pass property to others upon one's death in an effort to consolidate
splintered tribal allotments categorically amounted to a taking even
where the income generated from that property was de minimis.13 3
Though not in terms as explicit as the Babbitt opinion, several other
takings decisions in the 1990s rested on assumptions about property's
concrete and static nature, including Dolan v. City of Tigard,134 Phillips
v. Washington Legal Foundation,135 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,136 and
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. 137
As recently as 2000, one commentator reflecting on post-Lucas
caselaw described the Court's opinion in Lucas as having "sent a clear
message that the Constitution provided for nothing less than just
compensation whenever government action deprives owners of their
beneficial use of their private property. "1 Since 2001, though, the
Court's takings jurisprudence generally has moved away from the rigid
conception of property-as-liberty underlying the Lucas majority
opinion. The Court's disinclination toward categorical and principal
interest rules in the takings context is illustrated in the oft-cited
decisions of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,139 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
eager to embrace claims by property owners while dismissing rationales for regulation
proffered by state and local governments"); Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie,
Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as a Categorical Takings
Defense, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 321, 321 (2005) ("Advocates for expanded
property rights heralded the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commission [sic] as the dawn of a new era . ).
132. 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
133. See id. at 244-45.
134. 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) ("Without question, had the city simply
required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather
than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a
dedication, a taking would have occurred.").
135. 524 U.S. 156, 162, 164 n.4 (1998) (holding that "interest earned on
client trust funds held by lawyers in IOLTA accounts [is] a property interest of the
client" that is "cognizable under the . . . Fifth Amendmen[t]" even where any interest
the client could have earned on those funds was "not likely to be sufficient to offset the
cost of establishing and maintaining" a private, interest-bearing account (alterations in
original)).
136. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
137. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
138. Nancie G. Marzulla, Clarence Thomas and the Fifth Amendment: His
Philosophy and Adherence to Protecting Property Rights, 12 REGENT U. L. REv. 549,
559 (2000).
139. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency," and Arkansas
Game & Fish Commission v. United States.141
In Palazzolo, the Court held that a claimant who purchases
property after a certain regulation is adopted is not automatically
precluded from later challenging that regulation as a taking. 142 In
isolation, this holding seems but the latest in the line of cases advancing
the property-as-liberty premise of Lucas that property interests are
abstract and rigidly defined, and thereby protected against government
interference. However, the Court explained that, on remand, the state
court should address "the merits of petitioner's takings claim under
Penn Central" to determine whether the imposition "is so unreasonable
or onerous as to compel compensation."143 "The right to improve
property," said the Court, "of course[ is subject to the reasonable
exercise of state [regulatory] authority, including the enforcement of
valid zoning and land-use restrictions." `
Palazzolo produced dueling concurrences from Justices O'Connor
and Scalia on whether the Court had walked back from the property-as-
liberty conception advanced in the Lucas majority opinion. Justice
O'Connor asserted that whether the claimant knew or should have
known about the challenged regulation's existence, as well as the
"purposes served" by that regulation and the "effects produced" by it,
all matter in the takings calculus.'45 Justice Scalia, meanwhile, insisted
that takings analyses concentrate on what within the claimant owner's
borders has been lost; on his view, the fact that a claimant may have
acquired property after the enactment of the challenged restriction is,
like the purposes and effects of the restriction, not relevant at all."'4
In Tahoe-Sierra in 2006, the Court resolved this debate in Justice
O'Connor's favor. A six-Justice majority rejected the claimant's
contention that a development moratorium categorically should be
deemed a taking of all economically viable uses regardless of any
public interests advanced by the moratorium. 47 Instead, the Court held
that "[t]he Takings Clause requires careful examination and weighing of
140. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
141. 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
142. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636.
143. Id. at 627-28. On remand, a Rhode Island trial court judge rejected the
landowner's regulatory takings claim on the grounds that it was unreasonable for one to
expect to be able to fill and develop a saltwater pond and the adjacent marshlands. See
Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. July
5, 2005).
144. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
145. Id. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 320 (2002).
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all the relevant circumstances" via the "Penn Central inquiry.""
Similarly, a unanimous Court in its 2012 decision in Arkansas Game
declined to adopt a categorical rule deeming state-induced temporary
flooding either an automatic taking or, alternatively, wholly immune
from takings liability. 149 The Court held instead that such takings
disputes must be the subject of "case-specific factual inquiry" regarding
the duration and severity of the flooding, the state's intent, the
foreseeability of the result, the causal relationship between the state's
decision and the alleged injury, and the "character of the land at
issue. "150
There admittedly have been select recent takings decisions-
namely, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection,51 Koontz v. St. John's River Water
Management District,15 2 and Home v. Department of Agriculture'"5 -in
which several Justices lent some continued support to the property-as-
liberty ideal. However, these decisions came not at the core of
regulatory takings law but instead at its margins.
At least at first glance, perhaps the strongest link to the Lucas
majority's property-as-liberty view came in the 2010 matter of Stop the
Beach. In dicta, Justice Scalia stated for a four-Justice plurality that
takings liability is appropriate where a court newly declares that "what
was once an established right of private property no longer exists. "154
Categorically objecting to regulations as a result of their interference
with "established" property rights amounts to what one scholar has
declared a "discussion stopper."' If the sole issue in a takings case is
simply whether the claimant owner has been deprived of an
"established" property right recognized at common law,15 6 is it unfair
absent compensation for society to alter a prior course and decide, for
example, not to expose residents to the undesirable fumes emanating
from industrial plants, not to destroy the environment, not to subject
vulnerable parties to unconscionable loan terms, not to discriminate in
places of public accommodation, not to favor husbands over wives in
148. Id. at 327 n.23 (emphasis added) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636
(O'Connor, J., concurring)); id. at 334.
149. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 34 (2012)
(stating "government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable"
(emphasis added)).
150. Id. at 38-39.
151. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 715 (2010).
152. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
153. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
154. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715.
155. See Humbach, supra note 50, at 23.
156. Id. at 24.
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distributing property upon divorce? No Justice, in actuality, has ever
even intimated as much. Indeed, each member of the Court who signed
on to the plurality opinion in Stop the Beach has joined other majority
opinions that deem the types of "character of the burden" questions
posed above-whether it is legitimate for a property owner to expose
others to pollution, to destroy the environment, to issue predatory sub-
prime loans, to discriminate among customers, or to refuse to separate
marital property upon divorce-of relevance and import in takings
cases.15 7 Were it the Stop the Beach plurality's preference to keep the
many existing regulations that prohibit these types of acts of property
owners in place without compensation and to require compensation only
for those future regulations, it is not evident how-on the property-as-
liberty argument on which the Stop the Beach plurality's assertion
rests-these Justices might justify requiring compensation for new
takings but not old ones."' Ultimately, the bark of the "established"
language in the Stop the Beach plurality is far larger than its bite.
While Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor in concurrence rejected the
plurality's advocating for the creation of a "judicial takings" doctrine,
they suggested that the Due Process Clause "could" limit the power of
courts to "change established property rights.""' However, Justice
Kennedy's and Sotomayor's later explanation in Murr that property
rights are not "established" in the many instances in which they come
into conflict with the "whole of our legal tradition"-a tradition that
necessarily includes the state's pursuit of myriad public health, safety,
and welfare ends-marginalizes the value of Stop the Beach for
libertarian-minded takings claimants. Moreover, as explained below,
the Murr dissent offers little more doctrinal support for the Stop the
Beach plurality's "established rights" idea.
In 2013, the Court in Koontz slightly expanded the "special""
universe of land use permit conditions that the state, as the defendant in
a takings case, peculiarly shoulders the burden of proving bear an
"essential nexus" to and are in "rough proportionality" with the
proposed development's impacts.' 6 ' However, the prediction by many
scholars upon the decision's release that Koontz would herald a far
greater expansion of that universe of takings cases to which such
157. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)
(emphasis omitted); Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604.
158. Arizona legislation, without justification, seemingly follows this course.
See Jeffrey L. Sparks, Comment, Land Use Regulation in Arizona After the Private
Property Rights Protection Act, 51 AlRz. L. REv. 211 (2009).
159. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 733-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
160. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
161. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.
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heightened judicial scrutiny applies has not come to pass to date in the
lower courts.162
In 2015, Home described Loretto as "reaffirm[ing] the rule that a
physical appropriation of property [gives] rise to a per se taking" and
extended that per se rule from the land context (as was the case in
Loretto) to the personal property context "without regard to other
factors."163 Yet the Court simultaneously recognized a limitation to this
rule when the state deems possession or use of a certain item of
personal property "dangerous," which, for those rare future cases
involving outright physical appropriations of personal property,
necessarily reflects not a categorical form of analysis but instead one
that takes into account the implications for and harm to the public. "
This very brief survey illustrates that the libertarian understanding
of property underlying the Lucas majority opinion slowly had been
fading from view in terms of the core of regulatory takings law for
some time leading up to the 2017 case of Murr v. Wisconsin.'6 1 In
Murr, though, the Court subjected the property-as-liberty understanding
to an especially damning critique.
B. The Mounting Influence of the Property-as-Society View
Lucas had left unanswered what came to be known as the
"denominator" question of how a jurist is to determine the nature of the
property interest against which the now restricted interest-the
"numerator"-should be compared.1 6 6 For example, were a new
wetlands regulation to prohibit development on 90 of a claimant's 100
acres, Justice Scalia wrote in Lucas that
it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in
which the owner has been deprived of all economically
162. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, The State of Exactions, 60 WM. & MARY L.
REv. (forthcoming 2019). The author has discussed Koontz and its place amidst what is
known as "exaction" takings law in some detail in prior work. See, e.g., Timothy M.
Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
137 (2016); Timothy M. Mulvaney, On Bargaining for Development, 67 FLA. L. REv.
F. 66 (2015); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REv.
511 (2012); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
277 (2011); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y J. 189 (2010).
163. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (emphasis
omitted).
164. Id. at 2430-31.
165. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
166. Professor Frank Michelman coined the "denominator" term in this
context in a still-celebrated article fifty years ago. See Michelman, supra note 82, at
1192.
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beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one
in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of
the tract as a whole.16 7
After denying numerous petitions for certiorari in cases involving the
issue," the Court agreed during its 2016-17 term to take it up in Murr.
The Murr siblings accepted a developed parcel known as "Lot F"
as a gift from their parents in 1994 and the adjacent undeveloped
parcel, "Lot E," as a gift from their parent's corporation one year
later. 169 Both lots fronted a nationally designated "Wild and Scenic
River. "170 In accord with state regulations and a parallel local ordinance
enacted in the 1970s to "guarantee the protection of the wild, scenic,
and recreational qualities of the river for present and future
generations," neither lot in isolation had a sufficiently large area on
which to erect an occupied structure. 17 However, to the extent the lots
remained in separate ownership, they could be developed under the
ordinance's hardship exemption. 172 Once they came into common
ownership, though, the hardship was alleviated because the Murrs at
that point had options for development of, if they so chose, an
especially large home spanning the two lots. Therefore, the exemption
no longer applied, such that Lots E and F were now "merged" and
could not be "sold or developed as separate lots." 1 7 3 The Murrs-
allegedly unaware of this merger ordinance when they acquired Lot E
and frustrated that they were prohibited from moving forward with
their plan to sell it to fund improvements to the home on Lot F (which
had been the victim of repeated riverine flooding events)-filed a
takings suit against the State of Wisconsin and St. Croix County. 174
167. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
168. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harris v. Miss. Dep't of
Conservation, 516 U.S. 930 (1995) (No. 95-142); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, K &
K Constr., Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 525 U.S. 819 (1998) (No. 97-1957);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Karem v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 528 U.S. 814
(1999) (No. 98-1866); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship
v. District of Columbia, 531 U.S. 812 (2000) (No. 99-1663); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 1002 (2002) (No.
02-321); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Giovanella v. Town of Ashland Conservation
Comm'n, 549 U.S. 1280 (2007) (No. 06-927); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rose
Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 U.S. 935 (2010) (No. 09-342).
169. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1956.
170. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1274(a)(6), (a)(9) (2012).
171. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 30.27 (1973)).
172. Id. at 1940-41.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1941.
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The Murrs contended that lot lines presumptively should determine
the relevant "parcel" in takings cases.175 In their view, lot lines serve as
the boundaries of one's ownership and, if the owner stays within
them-both literally and figuratively-her desire to put the land to a
particular use generally should be respected and protected. 176 The
Murrs claimed that they were acting within their boundaries in
attempting to sell Lot E as an individually developable piece of land,
such that the ordinance resulted in an unconstitutional total taking of
that lot under Lucas's categorical formulation. 177
In defense, the State of Wisconsin asserted that the two lots
collectively should be considered the relevant "parcel" for takings
analysis purposes on the positivist grounds that the state's laws say the
two lots are merged.178 This position effectively would immunize the
state from regulatory takings liability here and in most any other case,
but leave open the- prospect of Wisconsin residents' succeeding in
takings claims against the federal government.1 7 9 Meanwhile, the
County contended that a series of considerations are at play in
determining the relevant parcel, including state law (as the state had
advocated) but also the reality of the economic impact of construing
these multiple lots as one and "the physical and geographic
characteristics of the property."18o The County believed that, on these
considerations, no taking occurred because the merger clause was a
reasonable land use regulation under which Lots E and F, in light of
their character, together held numerous residual developmental uses."
175. Id. at 1947; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 17:12-14, Murr,
137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214) (Counsel for the Murrs: "[Y]ou look to the State law, not
the whole body of State law, you look to the State law that governs the creation that's
the legal recognition of lots . . . .").
176. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 12-18, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933
(No. 15-214).
177. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 69:18-22 ("[W]hen
the regulations redefine and impose a new definition, the reliance that previously
existed is undermined. And that is the gravamen of the takings claim.").
178. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946. In the words of one commentator, the State of
Wisconsin advocated for a "categorical rule in which state law, both the bitter and the
sweet, controlled." See Thomas, supra note 42, at 8.
179. Chief Justice Roberts critiqued the State's contention at oral argument.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 32:18-21 ("You can't sort of
preempt the takings analysis by saying we're only going to look at this aspect under
which, of course, we win."); see also Underkuffler, supra note 115, at 114 ("If
'property'-the core material of the constitutional right-is a matter of state law . . .
there is often not much left for the exercise of federal power.").
180. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 51:9-52:10.
181. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County at 55-56, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933
(No. 15-214). The federal government agreed with the overall framework of the
County's position, if not the specific considerations the County deemed relevant. See,
e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 59:17-22.
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It placed particular emphasis on the fact that the assessed value of Lots
E and F together for one home was $698,000, while the assessed value
of Lots E and F with individual homes on each totaled just nine percent
more, or $771,000.182
In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, a majority of the
Court's members rejected the Murrs' position as "flawed,"
"ignor[ant]," and an unsoundly self-serving concentration on one strand
of state law-the original lot line demarcations-to the disregard of all
others.183 Lot lines, the Court insinuated, are made to serve technical
and administrative objectives that are far distinct from the federal
constitutional objective of assuring fairness and justice in the allocation
of property interests.184 The Court found that the State's position was
imprecise, too, for it merely and "formalistic[ly]" identified one
consideration-the bulk of state positive law, including the challenged
merger ordinance-among a series of considerations that are pertinent
to determine whether the state has taken a property interest for federal
constitutional purposes."8 Without suggesting they are exclusive,186 the
Court identified three such considerations that bore great similarity to
those the County had proposed: (1) how the land is treated under the
myriad applicable state and local laws, including those regarding lot
lines and all other reasonable provisions affecting use and transfer; (2)
the actual prospective value of the land; and (3) the extent to which the
land's physical characteristics indicated that its available uses might be
limited in the future. '
Upon an application of the totality of these considerations to the
facts of Murr, the Court deemed Lots E and F to bear a "special
relationship" that counseled in favor of deeming them a single parcel
for federal takings purposes.' The Court pointed to the fact that the
182. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 50:9-52:24 (discussing
the complementarity principle).
183. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947 ("[P]etitioners ask this Court to credit the
aspect of state law that favors their preferred result (lot lines) and ignore that which
does not (merger provision).").
184. See id.
185. Id. at 1946.
186. Mulvaney, supra note 51, at 152 n.23; John Echeverria, Big Victory for
State and Local Governments in Murr, TAKINGS LITIG. (June 26, 2017),
https://takingslitigation.com/2017/06/ [https://perma.cc/D3GJ-DUTQ].
187. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945 ("[N]o single consideration can supply the
exclusive test for determining the denominator. Instead, courts must consider a number
of factors. These include the treatment of the land under state and local law; the
physical characteristics of the land; and the prospective value of the regulated land. The
endeavor should determine whether reasonable expectations about property ownership
would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel,
or, instead, as separate tracts.").
188. Id. at 1949.
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lots had merged under the ordinance; the restrictions on Lot E
contributed to the value of Lot F's development potential; and the
Murrs should have known that their lands might be subject to
significant development restrictions because they bordered a national
Scenic River. 189 On this understanding, the Court found no partial
regulatory taking, for the state had fulfilled "its responsibility to justify
[the merger] regulation in light of legitimate property expectations" and
the Murrs' merged lot retained significant value and use potential.0
The first section below suggests that Justice Kennedy's opinion for
the Court in Murr demonstrates that the property-as-liberty view
supported by the Lucas majority is of scant remaining jurisprudential
impact and the property-as-society view endorsed by the Lucas dissents
is now quite influential in regulatory takings law. The second section
explains that, while the Chief Justice's Murr dissent includes an initial
passage that leans on the property-as-liberty idea, his opinion on the
whole includes a number of assertions to which supporters of the
property-as-society conception might cite for support in future cases.
1. THE MURR MAJORITY AND THE PROPERTY-AS-SOCIETY VIEW
This section is divided into three parts. The first outlines the Murr
majority's opposition to the property-as-liberty view, the second
highlights the majority's support for the property-as-society view, and
the third engages with the early academic commentary critical of the
holding.
a. Murr's Eschewal of the Property-as-Liberty View
The majority opinion in Murr marginalizes the property-as-liberty
view underlying Lucas at most every turn. Its first affront to the
contention that property creates a sphere of individual liberty that is
immunized from state interference comes just four lines into the
decision, where the Court suggests that "the background justifications
for the challenged restrictions" are a relevant consideration in
regulatory takings cases.1 91 Far from Justice Scalia's contention that
189. Id. at 1948-49.
190. Id. at 1946, 1949. The Court explained that, under the challenged
regulation, the Murrs "could preserve the existing cabin [on Lot F], or eliminate the
cabin and build a new residence on Lot E, on Lot F, or across both lots." Id. at 1941.
191. Id. at 1939; see also Daniel A. Farber, Murr v. Wisconsin and the
Future of Takings Law, 2017 SUP. CT. REv. 115, 142-44. The Murr Court's initial cite
to Lucas refers to Justice's Scalia's sheepish acknowledgement that an originalist view
of the Constitution does not support the very notion of a regulatory takings doctrine.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943. Murr is distinct from Lucas in a more pragmatic way, too.
While Lucas left undisturbed Mr. Lucas's implausible factual claim that his property
had been deprived of the entirety of its economic value, Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council,
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Lucas established a "categorical" rule that disregards regulatory
justifications, the Murr Court described Lucas as merely offering
"guidelines" relevant to "determining when government regulation is so
onerous that it constitutes a taking."1" Indeed, Murr almost seems to
mock Lucas's describing its holding as setting out a "categorical
formulation" by noting its many necessary "caveat(s)"l93 and
characterizing Lucas's "nuisance exception" as comprehensively
"recognizing the relevance of [presumably, all] state law and land-use
customs."194 "A central dynamic of the Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence," wrote Justice Kennedy in Murr, "is its flexibility."1 95
The Murr Court did quote the following assertion from Lucas:
"[T]he notion . . . that title is somehow held subject to the 'implied
limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically
valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture."l
However, it did so only to pitch this assertion not as the objective of
regulatory takings law but as one of two competing objectives. "The
other persisting interest," said the Murr Court, "is the government's
well-established power to 'adjus[t] rights for the public good.'" 97 It
described takings law as a "means to reconcile" these competing
objectives, not to serve the former at the expense of the latter. 198 There
is no "simple test;" 19 9 rather, such reconciliation can only occur
through "careful inquiry informed by the specifics of the case."2
While Lucas castigated approaches to takings cases that cannot be
employed on a "value-free basis," Murr asserts-echoing the Lucas
dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens-that takings analyses must
be "driven" by considered judgments surrounding the principles of
"fairness and justice."20
505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992), Murr called into question the Murrs' implausible claim
that, under the challenged regulation, Lot E would be worth $40,000 if sold as an
undevelopable individual parcel when, in fact, the regulation precluded the sale of Lot
E as an individual parcel. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943.
192. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942.
193. Id. at 1943.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028).
197. Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)) (alteration in
original).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1950.
200. Id. at 1943.
201. Id. (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001)).
Confusingly, Murr refers to its approach as "objective," but the bulk of the opinion
otherwise suggests that judgment cannot be avoided. Id. at 1945. As Professor Peter
Byrne notes in a recent article, "[e]ven if the determination needs to be one based on
954
Property-as-Society
Indeed, in Murr, Justice Kennedy goes so far as to quote a line
from his Lucas opinion-in which he concurred only in the Court's
judgment-that cuts at the heart of Lucas's categorical approach:
"Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile land
system that the State can go further in regulating its development and
use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit."20 2 I
other words, not all property is the same. That the Murrs' land sits
"along the river," coupled with its "rough terrain" and "narrow
shape," made it especially unreasonable for the Murrs to expect that
their "range of potential uses" would never by limited.203 Landowners,
wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court, must "acknowledge legitimate
restrictions."20 The Court concluded that this "reasonable land-use
regulation [requiring the merger of substandard lots] enacted . . . to
preserve the river and surrounding land" does not "work a taking."205
Thus, according to the Court, preserving the river and surrounding
lands are legitimate goals that are properly understood not as something
owners can ignore but instead as something that affects their
expectations about the use of their property.
b. Murr's Support for the Property-as-Society View
The Murr decision technically continues to treat the inquiry
surrounding how to define the regulated property as a precursor to the
inquiry surrounding whether or not that definition triggers takings
liability. However, it appears that, at least on a certain level of
generality, the two inquiries have been-ironically, like the Murrs' two
lots-merged. 206 "What, precisely, is the property at issue, "207 under
the Court's framework, is the driving question in a takings case. 20 8 If,
objective factual analysis, the judgment regarding the regulation of uses that harm the
public must be normative." See J. Peter Byrne, A Fixed Rule for a Changing World:
The Legacy of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 53 REAL PROP., TR. & EST.
L.J. 1, 17 (2018).
202. Id. at 1946 (quoting Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035
(1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring)).
203. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
204. Id. at 1945.
205. Id. at 1947, 1949-50.
206. This issue served as a source of contention at oral argument. See, e.g.,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 15:14-24; 20:13-21:11; 46:2-18;
48:8-49:20; 54:6-17; 60:19-61:6.
207. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941 (internal citation omitted).
208. This point is especially clear in a case like Murr, where the challenged
regulation's sole purpose is to define the denominator. See, e.g., Farber, supra note
191, at 132 ("[IUn cases like Murr, where the challenged regulation effectively merges
lots into a single whole, it is hard to see how the definition of the denominator can
avoid considering the legitimacy of the state's merger rule, which necessarily overlaps
with the test for whether a taking has actually occurred."); Nicole Stelle Garnett, From
2018:911 955
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based on what the Court referred to as a "complex of factors," property
is defined in a manner that is fair and just absent compensation, there is
no takings liability; if the definition is unfair and unjust absent
compensation, there is. On these terms, Murr moves takings law closer
to the understanding of property underlying the dissenting opinions of
Justices Blackmun and Stevens in Lucas. Consider, for example, an
environmental regulation that prohibits development on a claimant's
ten-acre wetland property. A wetlands preservation law's ability to
protect neighboring uplands and their inhabitants is not reliant on who
owns those uplands. 20 To the Murr Court, liability is not automatically
and definitively determined based on whether the claimant happens to
own additional lands that are not subject to the development
prohibition.210 The claimant's additional lands are highly relevant,
though, in those many instances where the regulation is based upon the
larger parcel.211
The considerations identified in Murr-to repeat, how the land is
treated under current law, the actual prospective value of the land, and
the extent to which the land's physical characteristics and surroundings
indicated its available uses might be limited in the future-are of the
a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131, 138
(suggesting that the "relevant 'parcel'" issue in Murr centered on a situation in which
"the government changed parcel boundaries").
209. Similarly, for example, a sub-surface extraction limitation's ability to
protect nearby surface lands and their inhabitants is not dependent on who owns those
surface lands. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]hy should a sale of underground rights bar the State's power?").
210. See Humbach, supra note 16, at 22 (lamenting the supposition that,
"[a]fter Lucas, regulatory protection of . . . vulnerable portions of our national
landbase depends on their being joined in larger parcels that have substantial value 'as a
whole'").
211. A regulation that is not based upon the larger parcel-a situation to which
the Murr Court refers as "[tihe absence of a special relationship between . . .
holdings"-may be more susceptible to taking's law's protections. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at
1945-46 ("[A] State might enact a law that consolidates nonadjacent property owned by
a single person or entity in different parts of the State and then imposes development
limits on the aggregate set. If a court defined the parcel according to the state law
requiring consolidation, this improperly would fortify the state law against a takings
claim . . . ."). Were the extent to which the challenged regulation was based upon the
larger parcel not relevant, it would seem that the Murr siblings' parents simply erred in
failing either to transfer their corporation (which owned Lot F) to their children or to
convey one of the lots to a newly created corporation held by their children. Such an
error hardly seems worthy of driving constitutional doctrine. Professor Eric Freyfogle
demonstrated prescience on this issue some time ago. See Eric T. Freyfogle,
Regulatory Takings, Methodically, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,313, 10,318 (2001) ("[I]t
could well be unfair for an owner of 10 acres, all wetland, to receive more favorable
treatment [through, for instance, application of Lucas's "categorical" rule] than the
owner of a similar wetland included in a larger tract. . . . [A] ban on mining in an area,
if lawful generally, would not require special treatment of a person who owned only the
right to mine (and, again, special treatment itself would raise fairness concerns).").
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sort that judges might draw on to determine whether a regulation is
based upon the larger parcel. These considerations might be best
understood not as a precursor to but rather as supplementing and
shedding light on each of the three broad considerations identified in
Penn Central.
First, prior jurisprudence on the "character of the governmental
action" demonstrates that regulatory takings claims generally succeed
only when the state cannot justify an imposition that is "functionally
equivalent" to that borne in an ordinary instance of eminent domain
without providing compensation.212 In the main, claimants are not
constitutionally entitled to compensation for abiding by democratically-
enacted and generally-applicable regulatory safeguards and obligations
that advance public interests,2 13 prevent owners from engaging in
activities that cause harm,214 or establish baseline standards for social and
market relations by, for example, shielding consumers from merchants'
deceptive practices.215 Takings compensation is more likely, though,
where a regulatory decision produces an unjustifiable confiscation of
property that is not (and is not likely to) cause harm2 16 or isolates
212. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
213. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1927) (holding that a
setback requirement did not constitute a taking); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926) (holding that a zoning scheme did not constitute a
taking); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1909) (holding that a statutory
building height limit did not constitute a taking).
214. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 500-02 (1987) (upholding a Pennsylvania regulation that limited how much
subsurface coal could be mined in order to protect surface structures); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962) (upholding a town regulation that
prohibited excavation below the water table, which in turn rendered petitioner's quarry
effectively useless); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 325 (1920)
(upholding a statute conditioning the burning of natural gas); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 409-11 (1915) (upholding a regulation that banned the operation of brick
factories within Los Angeles' city limits); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171, 176-77 (1915) (upholding a regulation banning livery stables from certain areas in
the community); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887) (upholding a regulation
that banned the production of alcohol for recreational purposes); Powell v.
Commonwealth, 7 A. 913, 915-17 (Pa. 1887) (upholding a law that outlawed the
production of oleomargarine).
215. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445-48
(1934) (upholding the constitutionality of a state mortgage moratorium law, which
allowed courts to extend the period of redemption for foreclosure sales); Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156-58 (1921) (holding that a rent control law, which regulated
rent prices and allowed tenants to stay in their apartments so long as they paid on time
and satisfied any other conditions of the lease, was not a taking).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-68 (1946)
(holding that the continued low-lying air flight of United States Army bombers above
the respondent's land constituted a taking); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166,
182 (1871) (holding that the flooding of petitioner's land as a result of the state's
decision to dam a river was a compensable taking).
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individuals among similarly situated persons to shoulder a wholly
disproportionate weight of that decision.217 Murr expands the inquiry into
the "character of the governmental action" by highlighting the
importance of the state's regulatory goal of environmental protection.
Determining whether the state is defining property in a manner that is
fair and just absent compensation is not based on the mere contiguity of
the regulated lot and other lots or the legal boundary delineated by local
governments for purposes unrelated to federal takings law's fairness
and justice inquiry, such as assessing taxes. Instead, says the Court,
this definitional process must account for "the surrounding human and
ecological environment. "219
Second, precedent focused on considering the extent to which a
regulation disturbs a takings claimant's reasonable "investment-backed
expectations" indicates that liability usually attaches, if at all, only when
uncompensated changes in the applicable standards retroactively impede
existing, non-harmful uses absent substantial justification.2 20 The more
217. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 37-
40 (2012) (holding that the temporary nature of government-caused floods did not
automatically preclude such floods from constituting a taking); Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at
182. For a fuller discussion of Arkansas Game within the larger picture of temporary
takings jurisprudence, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Temporary Takings, More or Less,
in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 461, 465-72 (R. Abate ed., 2015).
218. It remains to be seen whether the Court will endeavor to explicitly square
this position in Murr with the Court's 2005 holding in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005). Dicta in the Court's 1980 decision in Agins v. Tiburon suggested
that a regulation that does not "substantially advance a legitimate government interest"
amounts to a compensable taking. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980),
abrogated by Lingle, 544 U.S. 528. Twenty-five years later, though, the Court in
Lingle disavowed the "substantially advance" test as singlehandedly determinative of a
regulatory taking. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548. The Court asserted that this test authorized
a substantive review of the relationship between a regulation's design and the public
goals in adopting it, which is a traditional due process question. Id. at 543 ("The owner
of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state interest may
be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an
ineffective regulation."). Perhaps Murr is suggesting that the state's regulatory goal-
rather than the extent to which that goal is advanced, as the Agins dicta suggested-is
fodder for consideration in takings cases. Alternatively, Murr may be suggesting that
the extent to which a regulation advances legitimate state interests is relevant to the
takings calculus, though it is not subject to the Lochner-like judicial probing that the
Agins dicta seemingly indicated. A third possibility is that, while the Murr Court's
approach may not allow for consideration of the wrongfulness of a regulation in takings
cases, it is open to consideration of the rightfulness-the public interest and purpose
behind-the regulation. Regardless of whether the Court ultimately explicitly adopts
one or more of these courses, though, Murr makes it plain enough that avoiding a due
process analysis in takings cases does not mean wholly disregarding the public interest
the challenged regulation seeks to further.
219. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017).
220. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 136
(1978).
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common uncompensated changes that impact prospective uses generally
do not trigger takings liability. The considerations referenced in Murr
inform this inquiry by counseling courts to evaluate the reasonableness
of a claimant's "investment-backed expectations" not through the lens
of the claimant at the moment of her purchase but instead through the
lens of what a prudent investor has a right to expect. The inquiry,
explained the Court, is not tied to expectations commensurate with
background principles of the common law but instead with "background
customs and the whole of our legal tradition. "221
Third, takings precedent has suggested that where a prior non-
conforming use or similarly "vested" right is at stake, a regulation that
produces a substantial "economic impact" potentially could be considered
unfair absent the payment of compensation. However, acquiring vacant
land does not alone give rise to a vested right; a regulatory safeguard
enacted post-acquisition that prevents some future land uses ordinarily is
considered to result merely in a non-compensable lost opportunity.222
Murr, though, goes further in clarifying the import of the "economic
impact" of the challenged regulation. Particularly through its
acknowledging more forcefully than prior takings opinions the benefits
that regulations confer on landowners, the Court suggests that the
economic impact should be measured not from a baseline unfettered by
regulation (value-with-this-illegitimate-regulation versus value-without-
this-regulation) but instead from a baseline of legitimate regulation
(value-with-this-illegitimate-regulation versus value-with-legitimate-
regulation). Here, the state's regulation of land uses along the riverine
corridor actually may well have increased the value of the Murrs' lots
and those of their riverfront neighbors in the long ru223
Together, contemplating these refined considerations on the facts
of Murr produced a rather obvious result for the Court: Application of
Wisconsin's merger rule to "ensure the continued eligibility of the
Lower St. Croix for inclusion in the national wild and scenic rivers
system" by "reduc[ing] the adverse effects of overcrowding and poorly
planned . . . shoreline development" 224 without compensation is a
221. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
222. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 135-36 (stating that the regulation in question
will not affect the uses to which petitioner had put its property in the sixty-five years
prior to the case); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926)
(noting that the parcel of land in question had been vacant for years).
223. See Farber, supra note 191, at 131; see also Steven J. Eagle, Property
Rights and Takings Burdens, PRoP. RTS. CONF. J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at
30-31), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3071021 [https://perma.cc/6U8G-NSVQ] (querying
whether "the value of enjoyment of land that results only from the imposition of a
severe government restriction [should] be deemed an 'economic use' for purposes of
takings law").
224. See Wis. STAT. § 30.27(1) (1973-74); Wis. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.01
(2017).
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property allocation of a character that reasonably should have been
expected by the Muffs as an obligation of citizenship in these
circumstances, particularly in light of the marginal economic impact on
the Muffs' holdings.22 5 At bottom, then, Murr reflects a heavily
moderated version of the property-as-investment conception
underpinning Justice Kennedy's Lucas concurrence in the sense that it
is heavily infused with the property-as-society vision set out by Justice
Blackmun's and Justice Stevens's Lucas dissents. According to the
Murr Court, economic analysis of the claimant's initial investment does
not definitively reveal the fairness and justice of lawmakers' decisions
about the scope and protection of property. Incentivizing investment
surely is one relevant variable, and economic analysis can provide
information on the costs of the available choices for allocating property
interests that help lawmakers decide how to serve the many democratic
values that are property's aim. Liberty also is highly relevant, but it
must be evaluated in context and relative to those same interests of
others. Reminiscent of the dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in
Lucas, Murr conceives of property as serving a whole host of evolving
social goals, including, here, the preservation of the river's ecological
functioning. The decision respects what Professor Joseph Sax called the
"economy of nature," where "connections dominate."226
c. Initial Critiques of Murr as Takings Doctrine
While the academic response to Murr is just beginning to
materialize, the limited writing to date consists primarily of
dissatisfaction from scholars generally amenable to the conception of
property-as-liberty.227 Professor Maureen Brady issued the first such
cutting critique. She described the Court's approach as a "careless"
extension of the "maligned" Penn Central framework that "gives
individual states' positive law of property short shrift" and undermines
225. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
226. Sax, supra note 43, at 1445 (asserting that "single ownership of an
ecological service unit is rare"); see also Byrne, supra note 104 at 241-47 (advocating
an orientation of property that tends to land's interconnected natural functions).
227. See, e.g., Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many
Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PENN. L. REv.
ONLINE 53 (2017); Garnett, supra note 208; Thomas, supra note 42; Eagle, supra note
223; James W. Ely, David Callies and the Future of Land Use Regulations, 7
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. (forthcoming 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3109942 [https://perma.cc/RJ2S-S2DS]; Luke A. Wake, The
Enduring (Muted) Legacy of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Quarter
Century Retrospective, 28 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1, 24 (2017). Exceptions include
Farber, supra note 191; Sterk, supra note 36; Elisabeth H. Carter, Murr v. Wisconsin:
A Victory for "Fairness and Justice" in the Regulatory Takings Denominator Analysis,
42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 287 (2018).
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"the federalist structure of constitutional property law." 228 Professor
Brady suggests that courts who share her concerns about "property
federalism" might consider "establish[ing] evidentiary hierarchies
within the Murr factors [that] giv[e] greater weight to the state's
common law of property than to recently enacted land use
regulation. "229
On Professor Brady's view, that a state may recognize "flatly
undesirable forms of property" is not reason to reject federal takings
liability in the face of new regulation but instead only reason to make
"persuasive arguments" about what the state does and does not
recognize as property in the first place.230 She argues that "one of the
virtues of the Takings Clause is the flexibility it gives governments to
shift and redraw entitlements" upon the payment of compensation, in
lieu of what she sees as the lone alternative of precluding any such
shifting and redrawing at all. 231 Indeed, she describes "the
compensation mechanism" as "a built-in safety valve for eliminating
[via regulations] property interests later determined to be
undesirable." 23 2 Professor Brady objects to the fact that, after Murr,
state defendants in takings cases will "marshal evidence from across
time and space to make [such] new regulation seem reasonable" absent
compensation.233 She describes "Murrs' resort to various forms of
'reasonableness' "-especially those that are disconnected from the
specific existing regulatory regime in the locus of the dispute-as
"weaken[ing] constitutional protections for varied state property
interests. "234
Professor Brady does acknowledge that new legislation, like the
common law, can "confer[] rights or creat[e] relationships,"2 35 and she
lauds the ability of states to "compet[e] and innovate[e]" through
228. See Brady, supra note 227, at 53-54, 56.
229. Id. at 70 n.102.
230. Id. at 62 ("[Sltates may recognize flatly undesirable forms of property
that seem unworthy of federal protection, like the extreme example of property in
slaves. . . . Of course, [this] problem[] might be better addressed by making persuasive
arguments about what limits constitutional property should have, rather than calling for
the elimination of constitutional property federalism.").
231. Id. at 64.
232. Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 37, at 184 (describing the just
compensation requirement as "an intermediate position between two unpalatable
extremes").
233. Brady, supra note 227, at 68.
234. Id. at 70; see also id. at 56 (opposing what she sees as the Court's
"replacing the inquiry into the form and content of property within a single jurisdiction
with an analysis of reasonable property rules and expectations that is divorced from
jurisdictional boundaries").
235. Id. at 59.
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"property forms." 23 6 "[C]onstituents of a jurisdiction," she writes, "can
use political control mechanisms to obtain forms of property reflecting
their preferences," and "[i]f a unique property form in one state carries
with it significant benefits, other states can follow on and adopt it." 237
For example, she praises those states who, late in the nineteenth
century, "began recognizing new forms of 'easement[s] of access'
through common law and statutory law in order to protect property
owners from local government actions [namely, street re-gradings]
harming their interests. "238
While Professor Brady makes these assertions to support her view
that the "guarantee of constitutional protection is a mechanism by
which new property rights are stabilized," 239 they instead serve to
expose the tension within property that the property-as-liberty
conception does not fully appreciate. How can constituents use political
control mechanisms to obtain forms of property reflecting their
preferences if their preferences conflict with a prior generation's
preferences that already had been reflected in property laws? How can
the citizens of one state follow on and adopt a unique property form
that proved desirable for some owners in another state without
negatively affecting the interests of others that were secured prior to
this property form's adoption? To draw on her own example, property
owners opposed to those easements of access-for example, presumably
those benefitting from the improved access to their properties resulting
from the road regrades-might well have had a claim in the late
nineteenth century that the easements interrupted one of their
previously recognized rights or relationships. "Liberty" exists on both
sides of these property debates, and thus sheds little light, in and of
itself, on the fairness and justice of constituents using "political control
mechanisms" to reflect their preferences or mirror laws in other
jurisdictions absent compensation.
Professor Nicole Garnett is more circumspect than Professor
Brady in her appraisal of Murr. Similar to Professor Brady, though,
and in concert with critiques penned by Professor James Ely and
others, she disapproves of the Court's defining property for federal
constitutional purposes through reliance on what she deems "subjective
and malleable" considerations that are "decidedly pro-government."24
236. Id. at 63.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
239. Id. at 63.
240. Garnett, supra note 208, at 133; see also id. at 142 (describing the
considerations identified in Murr as "an entirely new laundry list of inchoate, vague
factors"); Ely, supra note 227, at *7 ("Kennedy offers an amorphous multi-factor
balancing test that is virtually worthless and is likely to disadvantage individual
owners."); Thomas, supra note 42, at 25 ("Murr created a metaphysical, social justice
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At the same time, though, Professor Garnett acknowledges the
difficulty in asserting simultaneously that (i) state law alone defines the
contours of property and (ii) the federal constitution prohibits a state
from defining property in a manner that is unfair and unjust absent
211
compensation. She writes: "[I]f states have the power to define what
property is, why can't they redefine what it is without compensating
property owners? Conversely, giving states carte blanche to regulate
away all the value of private property would render the protection
provided by the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause a dead letter." 24 2
Professor Garnett's critique, therefore, does not endorse in
absolute terms the property-as-liberty conception. But where the
critique settles is not altogether clear. On one hand, Professor Garnett
seems merely to challenge Murr's expression of what she concedes
must be a pluralistic process of defining property for "tip[ping] the
scales" too far in the government's favor.243 Indeed, contra Professor
Brady, Professor Garnett cites approvingly to the Court's assertion in
Palazzolo that the state has an "obligation" to avoid "unreasonable"
definitions of property rights absent compensation. 2" Likewise, she
concedes that there are no immutable "ordinary principles" of state
property law to "resolve contested questions about the nature and extent
of property rights affected by a challenged regulation. "245 Takings law,
suggests Professor Garnett, should rely on "reasoned analysis. "246 But
on the other hand, she excoriates the Murr majority for "emphasiz[ing]
the reasonableness of the merger provision" and "import[ing] public
policy considerations into the definition of private property itself." 247
This course, decries Professor Garnett, turns takings law's promise of
"fairness and justice" into "mere hortatory fluff. "248
Professor Garnett does not ultimately set out a preferred
methodology by which takings law might approach this tension.249 Yet
she nonetheless concludes that, echoing Professor Brady, "all property
warrior test for property . . . ."); Roger Bernhardt, The New Mathematics of Takings
Cases, 40 REAL PROP. L. REP. 108 (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3072759
[https://perma.cc/F9HP-KE2V] (expressing concern that Murr does not provide "much
clarity or predictability").
241. Garnett, supra note 208, at 132-33.
242. Id. at 133.
243. Id. at 139.
244. Id. at 141 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001)).
245. Id. at 148.
246. Id. at 149.
247. Id. at 143, 148.
248. Id. at 148 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
249. Id. at 149 ("In my view, Justice Thomas [in a separate dissent in Murr] is
correct that a historically grounded 'fresh look' is the only principled way to clear the
takings muddle.").
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owners, not just the members of the Murr family, lost in Murr."250 This
conclusion does not sufficiently account for the reality that democratic
lawmakers, when facing any conceived property dispute, must ask what
values recognizing the competing claims serve. In the course thereof,
these lawmakers must identify the reasons why our society might wish
to preserve or advance-or, contrarily, renounce or suppress-those
values.2"' As the property-as-society view underlying Murr appreciates,
a court adjudicating a takings case thus cannot avoid exercising its
judgment in evaluating the fairness and justice of such reasoning in the
face of a claim for compensation by one of the competing claimants.
2. THE MURR DISSENT AND THE PROPERTY-AS-SOCIETY VIEW
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and
Thomas, initially advocated an approach that could be considered a
hybrid of the approaches advanced by the Murrs and the State of
Wisconsin. On the whole, though, the dissent is riddled with language
to which those who favor the property-as-society view might turn for
support.
The Chief Justice wrote that "state law" both "define[s] the
boundaries of distinct units of land" and "the interests that come along
with owning a particular parcel." 2 52 He referenced the State's drafting
of lot lines as one especially relevant state law that defines boundaries,
but did not, as the Murrs had pitched, go so far as to describe those lot
lines alone as presumptively determinative of the relevant "parcel" in
takings cases .253 Though stopping short of the rule advocated by the
Murrs, the dissent contended that the majority's "malleable," multi-
consideration approach to identifying the denominator results in "the
government's goals shap[ing] the playing field before the contest over
whether the challenged regulation goes 'too far' even gets
underway. "254 Takings law, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, should
"protect[ property rights as they exist under state law." 2 55 From these
250. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
251. See generally Timothy M. Mulvaney & Joseph William Singer, Move
Along to Where? Property in Service of Democracy, in TRANSFORMATIVE PROPERTY
LAW: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF AJ VAN DER WALT 1 (G. Muller et al. eds., 2018).
252. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1953 (2017) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
253. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 1950, 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). This position echoed the Chief Justice's assertion
at oral argument that "I didn't think [justice] was applied to defining what the property
was because then you really do get . . . Penn Central squared." Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 175, at 48:16-18.
255. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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assertions, one could summarize the dissent's position in the following
terms: The State can define the boundaries of and interests associated
with property; however, once it does so, ownership and regulation are
divorced, such that any definitional adjustments implicate takings
256protections.
However, the dissent quickly diluted the import of this position in
two ways. First, it noted that looking to state law to "define the
boundaries of distinct units of land" is not sufficient in "exceptional
circumstances. "257 While the dissent did not elaborate on what
considerations might be relevant in determining whether these
circumstances are present, the mere reference to such circumstances is
itself a significant compliment to the majority's view that "indicia" in
addition to state law help shape the claimant's reasonable expectations
about property.2 58 Second, and more significantly, Chief Justice
Roberts's dissent asserted that the Murrs' ownership of the contiguous
parcel and their constructive knowledge of the merger rule at the time
they acquired that parcel both would weigh significantly against their
takings claim.259
The assertion by the dissent regarding the numerator in the takings
fraction-a fraction that is intended to represent the percentage of pre-
regulation value retained by the claimant post-regulation-effectively
negates any significance of the dissent's position on the denominator.
To the majority, Lots E and F both should be included in the numerator
and the denominator. On the majority's view, drawing on the figures
reported in the record, the numerator (the value of the lots merged) was
$698,000, and the denominator (the value of both lots if developable
individually) was $771,000, such that Murrs' total holdings diminished
in value by approximately nine percent as a result of the regulation.2 6
On the dissent's view, the numerator (the increase in the value of Lot F
after the regulation) was $325,000, and the denominator (the value of
Lot E absent the regulation) was $398,000, such that the Murrs'
relevant holdings diminished in value by approximately eighteen
256. See Brady, supra note 227, at 58; see also Eagle, supra note 223, at 26-
28 (criticizing Murr for "[c]onflat[ing] [o]wnership and [r]egulation").
257. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 1947. On the argument that the mere existence of exceptions
requires a contextual analysis in each case to determine whether those exceptions should
apply, see, for example, GREGORY ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING
185-86 (2018).
259. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Among other amici,
the federal government pressed this point during briefing. E.g., Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26-27, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No.
15-214).
260. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
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percent.2 6 1 Unsurprisingly, given the valuable uses that remain for the
Murrs under either approach, the Chief Justice explained that the
majority's conclusion that the merger ordinance did not effect a
compensable taking "d[id] not trouble [him]."262 The majority, noted
Chief Justice Roberts, "presents a fair case that the Murrs can still
make good use of both lots," for Lot E still could be used "as
'recreational space,' as 'the location of any improvements' [on the lots
as merged], and as a valuable addition to Lot F." 263 The dissent further
aligned with the majority in asserting that whether the Murrs "could
have predicted Lot E would be regulated" is relevant in a takings case,
for it "speak[s] to . . . interference with 'investment-backed
expectations.' "264
The Chief Justice's dissent went on to describe regulatory takings
law not as a one-sided doctrine that positions property as legally
resistant to the government's interference-the property-as-liberty
view-but instead as "strik[ing] a balance between property owners'
rights and the government's authority to advance the common good." 2 65
Regulatory takings law, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, promises
compensation only for "particularly onerous regulatory actions. "266
Absent the "extreme" instance in which a regulation "denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land," the dissent
explained that "a flexible approach is more fitting. "267 On this flexible
approach, the appropriate considerations to determine what the Chief
Justice called takings law's "traditional touchstone"-whether a
regulation, "in all fairness and justice," is enforceable absent
compensation-are "wide ranging. "2' Apparently among many others,
these considerations include the "importance" and "reasonableness" of
the regulatory safeguard or obligation at issue,269 the extent to which the
claimant property owner "may have been especially surprised, or
261. See Farber, supra note 191, at 20-21.
262. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1950, 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
265. Id. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
266. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Owners can rest assured that they will be
compensated for particularly onerous regulatory actions, while governments maintain
the freedom to adjust the benefits and burdens of property ownership without incurring
crippling costs from each alteration.").
267. Id. at 1951-52 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)). See Epstein, supra note 37, at 155, 179 ("The
dissent . . . did not at any point question the soundness of [the Penn Central]
framework.").
268. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954, 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 1954-55 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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unduly harmed,"2 70 and whether the regulation "load[s] upon one
individual more than his just share of the burdens of government." 271
Regulatory takings law, suggests Chief Justice Roberts, does not consist
of the mechanical application of rigid rules but instead requires a "fact-
intensive" inquiry that necessarily involves "'the exercise ofjudgment. '"272
While the foregoing assessment has contended that the dissent
includes ample doctrinal fodder for those sympathetic to the property-
as-society view, Professor Steven Eagle interpreted the Chief Justice's
Murr dissent as signaling an "unarticulated" fear that "the majority's
opinion reflects a movement from Lockean property towards
governance property, which attenuates traditional notions of owners'
rights. "273 However, if the phrase "traditional notions of owners'
rights" is intended to mirror the property-as-liberty conception,
pointing to John Locke for support is only possible if one "excis[es]
from [Locke's] theory several of its foundational elements. "274
Locke's chief writings on property considered the problem of
justifying individuals' appropriation of resources endowed to all in
common. He posited that one who "hath mixed his Labour with, andjoined to it something that is his own, . . . makes it his Property. "275
However, Locke subjected this labor theory to three significant
constraints. First, the "waste" restraint demands that no individual
appropriate so much of a resource that some of that resource might go
unused. 2 76  Second, the "sufficiency" constraint suggests that
appropriations are proper only so long as "there is enough and as good
left in common for others. "277 Finally, the "charity" constraint suggests
that, so long as the waste and sufficiency constraints are heeded, the
270. Id. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Monongahela Nay. Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893)).
272. Id. at 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986)). As one prominent property and
environmental scholar described it, "the divide between the majority and dissent in
Murr is not that substantial." Percival, supra note 131, at 17. The Chief Justice
evidently sees the distinction between regulatory and physical takings as valuable
doctrinally, for he recently supported a categorical approach in writing for the court
that a price-control regulation requiring raisin growers to turn over a percentage of
their raisins to the government each year amounted to a taking under Loretto. See
Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015).
273. See Eagle, supra note 223, at 32 (emphasis added).
274. GREGORY ALEXANDER & EDUARDO PE&ALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY 35 (2012).
275. JoHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Mark Goldie ed.,
Everyman's Library 1993) (1690).
276. Id. at 31.
277. Id. at 27.
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community must acquiescence and defer to appropriations by those who
need the resources they intend to appropriate to survive. Taking these
restraints into full account, the effects of scarcity, in the words of one
prominent scholar, "defeat most of the point of Locke's arguments"
and, indeed, more persuasively provide "a foundation for socialism
rather than 'possessive individualism." 2 79 It follows that Lockean
property and what Professor Eagle refers to as "governance property"
are not all that dissimilar. Between the counter-Lockean view that
rights to all resources are pre-political and immunized from government
interference and the actual Lockean view that rights to resources, when
scarce, necessarily must be subject to collective governance, the Murr
dissent includes more passages than not that seemingly side with Locke.
Parts H through IV of this Article contended that, on normative
grounds, the conception of property-as-society underlying Justices
Blackmun's and Stevens's Lucas dissents presents a more helpful
structure for assessing the justificatory nature of an allocative choice
absent compensation than the property-as-liberty and property-as-
investment conceptions underlying, respectively, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Lucas and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the
judgment. The Part just concluded here-Part V-has maintained that,
on doctrinal grounds, the property-as-liberty conception welcomingly
has fallen from grace in takings jurisprudence and the property-as-
society conception, as evidenced in both the majority and the dissent in
Murr, has ascended to a position of jurisprudential prominence.280
CONCLUSION
Modern regulatory takings disputes present a key battleground for
competing conceptions of property. The Supreme Court's splintered
1992 opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council elicited three
leading theories: Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court rested on the
libertarian view that property creates a bulwark of freedom against state
interference; Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the judgment saw
278. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 148-57
(1988).
279. See LAWRENCE BECKER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 36-43 (1977); see also T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution,
and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1723-34 (1988).
280. During the editorial stage of the publication of this article, Justice
Kennedy announced his retirement from the Court. Now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh has
been confirmed to replace him. The fact that Justice Kennedy was in the majority in all
ten of the regulatory takings cases in which he participated suggests that Justice
Kavanaugh may have an opportunity to reorient takings jurisprudence in some respects,
if he is so inclined. See Percival, supra note 131, at 17-18.
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property as a tool of economic investment; and the complementary
dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens rejected these property-as-
liberty and property-as-investment views in favor of a more progressive
property-as-society view that sees property as serving a host of
evolving communal goals.
The property-as-liberty view underlying the Lucas majority is
valuable to the extent that it illustrates how property can enhance
liberty. However, it fails to appreciate that property can enhance the
liberty of some only at the expense of the liberty of others. Therefore,
this conception of property is not in and of itself useful in determining,
as the Takings Clause demands, which varieties of liberty are fair and
just to constrain absent compensation and which ones are not.
Similarly, the property-as-investment view on which Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in the judgment rested concentrates on the investment-
backed interests of the claimant while paying short shrift to those
competing investment-backed interests of others. Moreover, both the
property-as-liberty view and the property-as-investment view suffer
from the fact that they focus on a single democratic value-freedom and
industry, respectively-when, in actuality, property exists in service of
plural democratic values.
The property-as-society conception underpinning the Lucas
dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens appreciates the plural nature
of the values that property serves. Liberty and economic investment
surely are among these values, though they rest alongside other moral
and practical democratic values, such as human dignity, equality, and
ecological preservation for future generations. Property disputes
involve competing claims that serve these various values in various
degrees. In a constitutional democracy, the state has no escape where,
as is often the case, resources cannot readily be shared-it must choose
among these competing claims and the values that these claims serve by
defining and enforcing property rights. In choosing among these
competing claims, the state is tasked with deciding what property rights
are legitimate given their effects on other individuals and the
community at large. This state decision-making process does not occur
in a single moment, at which point "established" property rights vest
and the state is forever disabled from altering those rights absent
compensation.281 Rather, this process is a democratic one that requires
accounting for the reality that social, economic, and moral perspectives
281. See, e.g., Tideman, supra note 279, at 1715-22 ("The idea of justice
evolves as we become aware that our definitions and presuppositions lead to difficulties
that can be avoided by an alternative framework."); Francis S. Philbrick, Changing
Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 696 (1938) ("[Tlhe concept of
property never has been, is not, and never can be of definite content. . . . Changing
culture causes the law to speak with new imperatives, invigorates some concepts,
devitalizes and brings to obsolescence others.").
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on both the content of the values that property serves and what might
harm these values evolve in the face of changing times and conditions.
Property is society. There is no mechanical or "simple test" to
determine whether or not regulatory takings liability should attach in a
given case. 282 instead, there are only all-things-considered exercises in
moral and political judgment, with the benefit of takings precedents that
shed light on what is contemporarily fair and just absent compensation
in hand. The Court's 2017 decision in Murr v. Wisconsin suggests that
it is this lesson-a lesson underlying the dissents of Justices Blackmun
and Stevens of some twenty-five years ago-that most powerfully
serves as Lucas's legacy.
282. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017).
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